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I.

INTRODUCTION

On April 1, 1984, the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure once again
were the subject of a major facelift, the goal of which was to modernize the rules in the continuing fight against outmoded methods of
procedure. One area of procedure that is the subject of numerous
amendments is "discovery.''I
The 1984 amendments are the result of the combined efforts of
the State Bar Committee on Administration of Justice, the Advisory
Committee of the Supreme Court of Texas, the Texas Supreme
Court itself, and many other interested members of the Texas Bar.
The participants in the amendment process sought to clarify the
1. This writing does not include a discussion of the rules affecting sanctions for discovery abuse, as that subject is covered in a separate article authored by Justice William W.
Kilgarlin and Don Jackson. Kilgarlin & Jackson, Sanctions ForDiscovery Abuse Under New

Rule 215, 15

ST. MARY'S

L.J. 767 (1984).
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rules and to strengthen the full discovery policy that underlies Texas
discovery. 2 Additional goals of discovery are to "augment and facilitate the trial procedure, to narrow the actual issues in dispute, and
to change the trial of a lawsuit from a game of chance and surprise
.. .to an orderly process of unclouding matters and uncovering the
actual facts involved."3 Many of the amendments include provisions enhancing the discretion of the trial judge to adjudicate discovery controversies.4
The individuals who participated in the amendment process also
evaluated the analogous provisions in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Historically, the federal rules have provided the basis
for many changes in the Texas rules, and the 1984 amendments also
look to the federal rules. Therefore, case law and experience in the
federal courts are often utilized in the construction and interpretation of the Texas rules. Reliance in this article on federal law, however, is not intended to dictate the construction of Texas rules.'
This article will outline the 1984 changes in Texas discovery procedure. Familiar provisions of pre-1984 rules will be cross-referenced to assist in locating them in their new context. An attempt
will be made to ascertain the probable interpretation of the new and
amended rules and to understand the practical application of the
1984 discovery rules.
2. Cf West v. Solito, 563 S.W.2d 240, 243 (Tex. 1978) (discovery allows parties to obtain full knowledge of facts and issues prior to trial); Martinez v. Rutledge, 592 S.W.2d 398,
399 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, writ refd n.r.e.) (full knowledge of issues and facts is aim
of discovery).
3. Pearson Corp. v. Wichita Falls Boys Club Alumni Ass'n, 633 S.W.2d 684, 686 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 1982, no writ). "The purposes of discovery are to narrow the issues for

trial, to obtain evidence for use at trial, and to obtain information that will lead to relevant
evidence." Koster v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 93 F.R.D. 471, 474-75 a.10 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).

4. Thus, the already-broad discretion of trial judges has been increased somewhat. Cf
Doe v. District of Columbia, 697 F.2d 1115, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (broad authority of district courts to issue protective orders that restrict discovery); O'Neal v. Riceland Foods, 684

F.2d 577, 581 (8th Cir. 1982) (broad discretion accorded to trial judge in controlling discovery procedures).
5. See Clevenger v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 396 S.W.2d 174, 183 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1965, writ refd n.r.e.) (federal decisions interpreting summary judgment proceedings
relevant in construing Texas summary judgment rule); Heid Bros. v. Smiley, 166 S.W.2d
181, 182 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1942, writ refd w.o.m.) (federal case law "persuasive,

if not controlling" in construction of Texas rules of civil procedure).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

3

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 15 [2022], No. 4, Art. 1

ST MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

II.

RULE

166b:

[Vol. 15:713

FORMS AND SCOPE OF DISCOVERY; PROTECTIVE

ORDERS AND SUPPLEMENTATION OF RESPONSES

One of the most drastic changes in Texas procedure is embodied
in new Rule 166b. 6 In the past, rules governing the scope of discovery had been scattered among the various rules.7 Now, all of the
guidelines regarding scope are set forth in Rule 166b. In addition to
combining the many provisions covering scope, several major
changes were made. Some of these changes are not traceable to any
prior rule.' Other scope provisions were simply moved from pre1984 rules into Rule 166b, with no changes made or intended.
A.

Forms of Discovery

Section 1 of Rule 166b sets forth the permissible forms of discovery.9 This provision is borrowed from Federal Rule 26(a), and it
provides a proper starting point for pretrial discovery.' 0 Rule
166b(l) provides that discovery may be had by oral or written depositions," 1 written interrogatories to a party,' 2 requests of a party for

admission of facts and the genuineness or identity of documents or
things,' 3 requests and motions for production, examination, and
copying of documents or other tangible materials,' 4 requests and
motions for entry upon and examination of real property," and motions for a mental or physical examination of a party or person
6
under the legal control of a party.'

6. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b.
7. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 167 (Vernon Supp. 1983) (discovery of documents and tangible
things); id 186a (Vernon 1976) (scope of discovery); id 186b (Vernon 1976) (protective
orders).
8. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(2)(a) (objection improper that question involves opinion of
fact or application of law to fact).
9. See id 166b(l).
10. Compare id 166b(l) (five permissible forms of discovery) with FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)
(five permissible forms of discovery).
11. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(l) (procedure of depositions found in TEX. R. Civ. P.
200).
12. See id (interrogatories found in TEX. R. Civ. P. 168).
13. See id (request for admissions in TEX. R. Civ. P. 169).
14. Seeid (requests for production of documents set forth in TEX. R. Civ. P. 167(l)(a)).
15. See id (Tex. R. Civ. P. 167(l)(b) sets forth procedure for requests for entry upon
land).
16. See id (TEX. R. Civ. P. 167a provides for mental or physical examination of party).
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Scope of Discovery

Rule 166b maintains exemptions as exceptions to the scope provisions.' 7 Moreover, as in former Rule 186a, the court may order limits on the scope of discovery.' 8 Rule 166b contains the admonition
formerly in Rule 186a that requested discovery must be relevant to
the subject matter of the lawsuit. Inadmissibility at trial is irrelevant, however, as long as the information sought "appears reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence."' 9
1. General
A new provision was inserted that provides that no objection will
be entertained, in response to an interrogatory or request for admissions, on the ground that the question involves an opinion or contention that relates to fact or the application of law to fact.2" The
rule thus sanctions the propounding of mixed questions of law and
fact.2 ' This is contrary to prior Texas law, which concluded that
questions of law 22 and mixed questions of law and fact 23 were not
permitted. Although Rule 166b(2)(a) permits mixed questions of
law and fact, the admissibility of the evidence obtained is in no way
affected by the change in the rule; admissibility is controlled by the
rules of evidence.24
Federal Rule 33 has permitted legal inquiries since the 1970
amendments; therefore, some clarification may be gained from an
examination of the construction of this rule in the federal courts.25
17. See id.166b(3).
18. Compare id 166b(2) (discovery may be limited by order of court) with TEX. R. Civ.

P. 186a (Vernon 1976) (court may raise protective orders to limit discovery).
19.
20.
21.
22.

TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(2)(a).
See id.
See id.
See Eskew v. Johnston Printing Co., 615 S.W.2d 287, 289 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas

1981, no writ) (request for admission calling for legal conclusion improper); American Title
Co. v. Smith, 445 S.W.2d 807, 809-10 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1969, no writ)

(requests for legal conclusions improper).
23. See International Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Maas, 458 S.W.2d 484, 489 (Tex. Civ. App.-

Houston [lst Dist.] 1970, writ refd n.r.e.) (mixed questions of law and fact improper subject
for requests for admissions).
24. See TEX. R. EvID. 701-05.
25. See FED. R. Civ. P. 33. Rule 33 provides in pertinent part:

An interrogatory otherwise proper is not necessarily objectionable merely because an
answer to the interrogatory involves an opinion or contention that relates to fact or the
application of law to fact, but the court may order that such an interrogatory need not
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The comment to Federal Rule 33 states:
Efforts to draw sharp lines between facts and opinions have invariably
been unsuccessful, and the clear trend of the cases is to permit "factual" opinions. As to requests for opinions or contentions that call for
the application of law to fact, they can be most useful in narrowing
and sharpening the issues, which is a major purpose of discovery [cites
omitted]. On the other hand, under the new language interrogatories
may not extend to issues of "pure law," i.e., legal issues unrelated to
the facts of the case.26

This comment recognizes the difficult task to be confronted by the
courts in delineating between proper and improper inquiries.
In determining whether a propounded interrogatory or request
for admissions asks a permissible or impermissible question, the
court must look at each question on its merits and attempt to ascer-

tain the purpose and intent of the question. 27 The federal rule has

been interpreted to "allow a litigant to require an opponent to answer interrogatories asking for a delineation of legal theories so long
as the question is calculated to serve a 'substantial purpose' in prosecution of the suit, such as narrowing of issues."28 Thus, the scope of
permissible inquiry is broad in the federal courts.29
Limitations, however, do exist. A question of law that is unrelated to the facts of the case has been held to be improper and

be answered until after designated discovery has been completed or until a pretrial
conference or other later time.
FED. R. Civ. P. 33.

26.
WRIGHT

FED. R. Civ. P. 33(b) advisory committee note to 1970 amendment;
& A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2167 (1970).

see 8 C.

27. See Roberson v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 48 F.R.D. 404, 414 (N.D. Ga. 1969) (courts
should consider merits of question and weigh need for information against prejudice to interrogated party).
28. Hockley v. Zent, Inc., 89 F.R.D. 26, 31 (M.D. Pa. 1980) (interpretation of FED. R.
Civ. P. 33(b)); see Empire Scientific Corp. v. Pickering & Co., 44 F.R.D. 5, 6 (E.D.N.Y.
1968) (courts liberal in allowing interrogatories when trial could be expedited).
29. See Dollar v. Long Mfg., N.C., Inc., 561 F.2d 613, 616-17 (5th Cir. 1977) (interrogatories broadly interpreted to allow questions "reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of
admissible evidence"), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978); cf. Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379
U.S. 104, 114-15 (1964) (Rule 35 liberally construed to permit mental and physical examination of party defendant). In Scovill Mfg. Co. v. Sunbean Corp., the court broadly stated that
discovery is proper if it might be expected to help the plaintiff know the extent of proof
required and save him labor and expense in producing evidence for which there would be no
actual need. SeeScovill Mfg. Co. v. Sunbean Corp., 357 F. Supp. 943, 948-49 (D. Del. 1973).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol15/iss4/1

6

Barrow and Henderson: 1984 Amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure Affecting D

1984]

CIVIL PROCEDURE

outside the scope of the rule. 31 Similarly, an inquiry into a matter
properly addressed to the court, such as the admissibility or credibility of evidence or testimony, is improper. 3 1 An interrogatory calling
32
for an opinion based upon an hypothetical question is not allowed.
In addition, an interrogatory is improper if the question concerns a
"pure conclusion of law."' 33 Finally, one federal court has held that,
a question of law
as a matter of fairness, a party may not propound
34
facts.
of
statement
abstract
based upon an
A reading of the federal cases ruling on questions of law versus
fact aptly depicts the amorphous nature of this concept. 35 For instance, it is not proper to inquire into a party's perception of the
legislative purpose of an act, this being a "pure" question of law.36
A plaintiff, however, may inqure of an airline defendant whether it
was required to maintain two-way radio communications with the
Federal Aviation Agency. 37 Both inquiries concern the interpretation of a law or administrative rule, but one is permissible and the
other is not. In a related area of concern, one federal court has held
that even though a question is primarily one of law, it will be per30. See O'Brien v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 443 F. Supp. 1182, 1187-88
(N.D. Ga. 1977) (unrelated pure legal question improper).
31. See Spector Freight Sys., Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 58 F.R.D. 162, 164 (N.D. Ill.
1973) (competency of witness to testify improper subject of interrogatory); cf Fireman's

Fund Ins. Co. v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 490 S.W.2d 818, 825 (Tex. 1972) (requests
for admission of truth or falsity of witness' testimony in another trial improper).
32. See Union Carbide Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 61 F.R.D. 411, 413 (W.D. Pa.

1973) (discovery rules directed at opinions of facts in controversy, not opinions based on
hypothetical facts).
33. See Roberson v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 48 F.R.D. 404, 414 (N.D. Ga. 1969) (interrogatory asking plaintiff to state each question of law common to class action suit improperly

calls for conclusion of law).
34. See Williams v. Thomas Jefferson Univ., 343 F. Supp. 1131, 1132 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
35. See Roberson v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 48 F.R.D. 404, 415 (N.D. Ga. 1969) (form of

interrogatory appeared to call for legal conclusion, but in substance called for opinion of
facts). In close cases of questions of law and fact, the trend in federal courts is to allow

"factual" opinions. See Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Texas Okla. Express, Inc., 43 F.R.D. 336, 337
(W.D. Okla. 1967); Diversified Prods. Corp. v. Sports Center Co., 42 F.R.D. 3, 5 (D. Md.
1967); see also Zinsky v. New York Cent. Ry. Co., 36 F.R.D. 680, 681 (N.D. Ohio 1964)

(interrogatory inquiring about plaintiff's conduct at time of injury proper because calls for
"factual" inference).
36. See Muzquiz v. City of San Antonio, 520 F.2d 993, 1002 n.8 (5th Cir. 1975).
37. See Anderson v. United Air Lines, Inc., 49 F.R.D. 144, 149 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (inter-

rogatory proper because did not require interpretation of administrative rule). But see Reed
v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 28 F.R.D. 26, 27-28 (E.D. Pa. 1961) (defendant not required to
answer whether brake system that it maintained was permissible under Air Brake Act).
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mitted if it relates to the routine business practice of a party; an
objection that the discovery involves questions of law and opinions
may be insufficient in such cases.38
Permissible forms of inquiry are numerous under a rule of discovery that allows questions based on the application of law to fact.
For example, the federal rules have been interpreted as allowing inquiry into how an accident occurred, even though the question invades the province of the jury and calls for a legal conclusion.3 9
Further, a party may ask the manner in which he was allegedly negligent' or the theory of negligence asserted by his opponent."' Similarly, it is permissible to ask a party if he followed the usual
customs, rules, and practices in performing work and, if not, what
customs and rules were disregarded.42
Another construction given Federal Rule 33 allows a party to inquire into whether an employee was acting within the course and
scope of employment at the time of an accident.43 A party may also
be asked if he was under a duty to take action under a given set of
facts, thus possibly eliminating the need for proof on this issue." In
addition, it is proper to inquire whether a party or his agent was
acting under any disability at the time of an accident.45 Also, one
may seek to ascertain how a machine or product malfunctioned, in
what way it was defective, or how the negligence in a given case

38. See Union Carbide Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 61 F.R.D. 411, 413-14 (W.D. Pa.
1973) (interrogatory seeking legal theories of insurance company's discharge of policy liabil-

ity proper).
39. See Goodman v. International Business Machs. Corp., 59 F.R.D. 278, 279 (N.D. I11.
1973).
40. See Hartsfield v. Gulf Oil Corp., 29 F.R.D. 163, 164 (E.D. Pa. 1962) (details of
negligence proper scope of interrogatory); B & S Drilling Co. v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 24 F.R.D. 1, 2-3 (S.D. Tex. 1959) (manner of negligence includes names of
defendant's employees and acts which form basis of negligence).
41. See Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Texas Okla. Express, Inc., 43 F.R.D. 336, 338 (W.D.
Okla. 1967) (interrogatory seeking plaintiff's opinion as to relationship between damages

and defendant's loading procedures proper).
42. See Zinsky v. New York Cent. Ry. Co., 36 F.R.D. 680, 681 (N.D. Ohio 1964).
43. See B & S Drilling Co. v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 24 F.R.D. 1, 6-7

(S.D. Tex. 1959) (interpretation of proper scope of interrogatories under FED. R. Civ. P. 33).
44. See Reynolds v. Southern Ry. Co., 45 F.R.D. 526, 528 (N.D. Ga. 1968) (interrogatory inquiring whether defendant had responsibility to maintain collapsed wall proper).
45. See Hughes v. Groves, 47 F.R.D. 52, 55 (W.D. Mo. 1969) (interrogatory inquiring

whether defendant was under physical disability affecting operation of car proper).
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occurred.46

In the field of commercial litigation, a party may ask the opponent whether he had ever assumed the status of an assignee of certain notes. 47 The federal rule also allows an inquiry into what
interpretation a party's opponent has given to a contract, contract
clause, or other agreement.48
Prior to the 1984 amendments, the customary method by which
one would obtain more specific allegations from his opponent was
through the use of special exceptions. 49 In addition to special exceptions, a party may now serve interrogatories to discover his opponent's legal contentions.5 0 If the response is inadequate, a motion
for a more particular response by a certain time may be filed. If the
opponent continues to refuse to disclose his true contentions, the
court would be justified in utilizing the many discovery sanctions
available for dealing with recalcitrant litigants.5 A party may also
be required to disclose
the basis of affirmative defenses intended to
52
be asserted at trial.
Having amended the rules to allow the use of mixed questions of
law and fact, it was necessary to adopt a provision for the protection
of the respondent. 3 Under Rule 166b(4), the court has the authority to issue orders to protect a responding party from "undue burden, unnecessary expense, harassment or annoyance, or invasion of
46. See Anderson v. United Air Lines, Inc., 49 F.R.D. 144, 147-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)
(interrogatory requesting information about malfunction of airplane proper).
47. See Joseph v. Norman's Health Club, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 307, 319 (E.D. Mo. 1971)

(interrogatory inquiring whether defendant was assignee of promissory note proper and does
not call for legal conclusion).
48. See Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 61 F.R.D. 115, 118-

19 (N.D. Ga. 1972). This interpretation of Federal Rule 33 may by analogy affect prior
Texas case law that held that the question of whether a person made a promise to pay was
an impermissible legal inquiry. See Eskew v. Johnston Printing Co., 615 S.W.2d 287, 289
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, no writ).
49. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 91.
50. See id 166b(2)(a). Rule 166b(2)(a)'s federal counterpart has been construed to permit parties to use various discovery tactics to ascertain the facts that form the basis of their
opponent's legal contentions. See Wright v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 93 F.R.D. 491,
493 (W.D. Ky. 1982); In re Trantex Corp., 10 Bankr. 235, 239 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981).
51. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 215 (sanctions for abuse of discovery). See generally Kilgarlin
& Jackson, Sanctions for DiscoveryAbuse Under New Rule 215, 15 ST. MARY'S L.J. 767, 793808 (1984) (general discussion of available discovery sanctions).
52. See Westhemeco Ltd. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 82 F.R.D. 702, 709-10 (S.D.N.Y.
1979).
53. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(4).
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personal, constitutional, or property rights."54 A protective order
may be proper when the proffered legal question could prejudice the
respondent by requiring him to limit his theory of recovery before
he is ready to do so. 5 Rule 166b(2)(a) also allows a party who is
asked to respond to a legal inquiry to move the court for permission
not to answer the discovery until after designated discovery has
56
been completed or until a pretrial conference or other later time.
In deciding how to rule on a motion for protection, the federal
courts have weighed many factors, including the nature of the case,
the knowledge of the respondent, the amount of discovery completed and to be attempted, and the "proximity of the issue to be
narrowed to the central issues in the case."57 When it appeared that
requiring an answer would unduly prejudice the party," one federal
court held that it was proper to order that no answer was required
until some specified time prior to trial or at trial.5 9
2.

Documents and Tangible Things

Rule 166b(2)(b) now includes a major portion of former Rule 167
and, to a lesser extent, Rule 186a, dealing with requests for discovery.6" The old rules' language has been rearranged, but the general
guidelines remain the same. 6 1 One major change is that now "possession, custody or control" is defined by whether the party upon
54. Id.
55. See Leumi Fin. Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 295 F. Supp. 539, 543

(S.D.N.Y. 1969) (interrogatory seeking opinion improper if answering party required to select legal theory before ready to do so); Berkley v. Newman Realty Co., 33 F.R.D. 516, 517
(W.D. Mo. 1963) ("maneuver[ing] adverse party into unfavorable tactical position" im-

proper use of interrogatories).
56. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(2)(a).
57. Leumi Fin. Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 295 F. Supp. 539, 543
(S.D.N.Y. 1969).
58. The court must find "undue" prejudice. A simple showing of some prejudice will
not suffice. See Federal Cartridge Corp. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 41 F.R.D. 531,
533-34 (D. Minn. 1967).
59. See Mid-America Facilities, Inc. v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 78 F.R.D. 497, 498 (E.D.
Wis. 1978). A court is more justified in postponing discovery than in denying it altogether.
See Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 706 F.2d 1488, 1493 (7th Cir.
1983) (less hardship on discovering party when discovery postponed and not denied).
60. Compare TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(2)(b) (discovery of documents within person's possession and relevant to case) with Tex. R. Civ. P. 167 (Vernon Supp. 1983) (discovery and
production of documents in person's possession) and Tex. R. Civ. P. 186a (Vernon 1976)
(scope of discovery limited to matters relevant to subject matter of case).
61. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 167 (Vernon Supp. 1983); Tex. R. Civ. P. 186a (Vernon 1976).
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whom the request is served has "a superior right to compel the production from a third party. '62 Thus, constructive possession has
been redefined.63
A major consideration in defining "a superior right to compel" is
to ascertain the legal status of the party from whom discovery is
sought with respect to the items in question, i.e., does the respondent
have the legal right to obtain the items sought.64 This necessarily
will depend on the facts of each case, and the burden is on the party
seeking discovery to show that the requested items are in the possession of his opponent.65 For example, discovery may be sought of a
party's bank records that are in the custody of the bank.66 If the
party may compel the bank to release the records to him, such information must be made available to the movant. 67 A similar rule governed discovery of tax records under prior practice6" and should
continue under the new rule.
While examining the legal rights of the respondent, the court concurrently should inquire into whether the respondent has the practical ability to meet the discovery request. 6 9 Rule 166b specifically

provides that one need not have "actual" possession of the documents or tangible things "[a]s long as the person has a superior right
to compel the production from a third party . -7o A reasonable
62. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(2)(b).
63. Compare id. (defines constructive possession in terms of "superior right to compel
production") with Tex. R. Civ. P. 167(8) (Vernon Supp. 1983) (defines constructive possession in terms of "a right to compel production").
64. See Stewart v. Bank of Pontotoc, Miss., 74 F.R.D. 552, 554 (N.D. Miss. 1977)
(plaintiff required to respond to interrogatories regarding her law school application as fully
as she could obtain information from the school); Firemen's Mut. Ins. Co. v. Erie-Lackawanna R.R. Co., 35 F.R.D. 297, 298-99 (N.D. Ohio 1964) (in answering interrogatories,
insurer required to obtain information from insured).
65. See Wharton v. Lybrand, Ross Bros. & Montgomery, 41 F.R.D. 177, 180 (E.D.
N.Y. 1966) (burden on movant to show that opponent has custody of items). A business,
however, is presumed to have custody of the records kept in the normal course of business.
See Norman v. Young, 422 F.2d 470, 472 (10th Cir. 1970).
66. See Hopkins v. Hopkins, 540 S.W.2d 783, 789 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1976, no writ).
67. See id at 789.
68. See Maresca v. Marks, 362 S.W.2d 299, 300-01 (Tex. 1962) (tax returns discoverable when relevant to controversy).
69. See Martinez v. Rutledge, 592 S.W.2d 398, 401 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ
refd n.r.e.). The ability to respond is implicit in all discovery actions. The respondent,
however, must use reasonable diligence in seeking to obtain the requested information. See
id. at 401.
70. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(2)(b).
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construction of this language would require that the respondent
have a right to access superior to that of the third person before
production may justifiably be demanded. To construe the rule
otherwise would result in cases in which the respondent would be
considered to have violated the rule when, though having a right of
possession superior to that of the movant, he in fact has little or no
actual ability to produce the requested materials. Therefore, if the
court finds that the respondent has either no legal right or no practical ability to obtain the items sought, the requisite constructive possession does not exist.
One area that has been the subject of some degree of confusion
concerns discovery of information held by sister or parent corporations of the party corporation. 7 ' The majority of federal courts hold
that non-party status of a related corporation is no excuse, implying
that each corporation may compel production from each other corporation.72 On the other hand, there is not total agreement with this
view, and one federal court found no right to compel production in
this scenario."
3. Land
Rule 166b now controls requests for entry upon land. 74 As with
requests for discovery, this portion of the rule is controlled by
whether the party 5 upon whom the request is served has a superior
right to compel a third person to permit entry.76

71. See Annot., 19 A.L.R. 3d 1134, 1138-42 (1968) (discussion of discovery of informa-

tion from affiliated or subsidiary corporation).
72. See, e.g., In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 97 F.R.D. 481, 483 (S.D. Ohio 1983)

(plaintiff entitled to discovery of documents in custody of defendant's foreign subsidiaries);
Brunswick Corp. v. Suzuki Motor Co., 96 F.R.D. 684, 686 (E.D. Wis. 1983) (defendant parent corporation required to disclose information concerning subsidiaries); Hubbard v. Rubbermaid, Inc., 78 F.R.D. 631, 636-37 (D. Md. 1978) (documents not shielded from

production merely because records were in possession of subsidiaries).
73. See Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Mountain States Mining & Milling Co., 37
F.R.D. 348, 349 (D. Colo. 1965) (subsidiary corporation not required to disclose information

concerning sales of parent corporation).
74. TEx. R. Civ. P. 166b(2)(c).
75. Id. Of course, the general rule is that the court may not order a nonparty to permit
entry on his land. See Pollitt v. Mobay Chem. Corp., 95 F.R.D. 101, 106 (S.D. Ohio 1982)

(court without authority to require nonparty corporation to permit plaintiffs entry on land);
Huynh v. Werke, 90 F.R.D. 447, 450 (S.D. Ohio 1981) (rule allowing entry on land applies

only to parties).
76. See Santa Fe Int'l Corp. v. Potashnick, 83 F.R.D. 299, 300-01 (E.D. La. 1979). The
Louisiana court held that a contractor's right to enter the premises of a subcontractor to
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Potential Parties and Witnesses

Subsection 2(d) of Rule 166b concerns potential parties and witnesses, and it is taken primarily from former Rule 186a.7 7 The new
rule sets forth a definition of persons having knowledge of relevant
facts as one who "has or may have knowledge of any discoverable
79
matter."78 This definition is taken from Federal Rule 26.
A major problem under the former rule was whether a party
could obtain a list of persons who had witnessed an accident or
event.8" Federal Rule 26(b)(1) has been interpreted to permit discovery of a list of fact witnesses, 8 ' and Texas courts may be inclined
to adopt this interpretation for Rule 166b(2)(d). A proposal was
made that the Texas rule should require the disclosure of persons
that a party expected to call to testify;8 2 however, the Texas Supreme
Court did not include this provision in the final83draft of the rules,
making it clear that no such list is discoverable.
inspect the final work product was not control such that the contractor could be required to
allow the movant access to the work area. See id.at 300-01.
77. Compare TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(2)(d) (discovery of identity and location of potential
parties and witnesses) with Tex. R. Civ. P. 186a (Vernon 1976) (identity and location of
potential parties and persons having knowledge of relevant facts discoverable).
78. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166b(2)(d).
79. Compare id (knowledge of relevant facts defined as knowledge of discoverable
matter) with FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (parties may discover identity of persons "having
knowledge of any discoverable matters").
80. Compare Lopresti v. Wells, 515 S.W.2d 933, 936-37 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1974, no writ) (identity of witnesses to car wreck discoverable) with Dallas Ry. & Terminal
Co. v. Oehler, 156 Tex. 488, 491, 296 S.W.2d 757, 759 (1956) (disclosure of names of passengers in street car at time of accident not required).
81. Compare TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(2)(d) (discovery of identity of witnesses) with FED.
R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (discovery of identity and location of witnesses). One concern in allowing discovery of a list of fact witnesses is that such a list may constitute work product.
Also, this information may, in some instances, be protected by the exemption in Rule
166b(3)(d), concerning communications made subsequent to the occurrence giving rise to
the cause of action. See generally Bell v. Swift & Co., 283 F.2d 407, 409 (5th Cir. 1960)
(defendant required to disclose names of persons "having knowledge of relevant facts");
Anderson v. United Air Lines, Inc., 49 F.R.D. 144, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (interrogatory requesting identity of witnesses to airplane crash proper); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.
King, 45 F.R.D. 521, 523 (W.D. Okla. 1968) (discovery of identity of witnesses allowed
during pretrial discovery but not prior to such time).
82. This provision would have overruled Employer's Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. of Wisconsin
v. Butler, 511 S.W.2d 323, 325 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.), which
held that discovery rules do not require a party to disclose potential trial witness.
83. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(2)(d). There is a conflict on this point in the federal
courts. Compare St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. King, 45 F.R.D. 521, 523 (W.D. Okla.
1968) (plaintiffs objection to discovery of potential trial witnesses sustained) with Lloyd v.
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Rule 166b(2)(d) also provides that information sought from potential parties or persons having knowledge of relevant facts need
not be based on personal knowledge. 84 Under the new rule, the respondent should refuse to answer a question or make available the
requested information only if he is unable to obtain the requested
85
information after a diligent search and inquiry.
5. Experts and Reports of Experts
Subsection 2(e) of Rule 166b sets forth all provisions governing
the discovery of experts and expert reports.86 As in the former rules,
the information sought from the expert must be relevant to the
pending action. 7 Also, the information must have been acquired in
anticipation of the subject litigation in order to be subjected to the
more rigorous standards of Rule 166b(2)(e).88
Instances do arise in which information is sought from an expert,
but that information was not acquired in anticipation of litigation.
For instance, in Barkwell v. Sturm Ruger Co., 89 the plaintiff sought
to depose a non-testifying expert who was employed by the defendant concerning research previously conducted by the expert.9" The
court held that since the information sought was not obtained in
anticipation of litigation, the plaintiff was entitled to discover it. 9'
Cessna Aircraft Co., 434 F. Supp. 4, 8 (E.D. Tenn. 1976) (party required to disclose name
and location of trial witnesses) and United States Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n
v. Metropolitan Museum of Art, 80 F.R.D. 317, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (interrogatory requesting names of all lay and expert trial witnesses proper).
84. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(2)(d); cf. Olmert v. Nelson, 60 F.R.D. 369, 370 (D.D.C.
1973) (Federal Rule 26 does not allow answering party to limit responses to interrogatories
only to personal knowledge).
85. Cf Ballard v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 67, 69 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (if answer
to interrogatory not available after reasonable inquiry, interrogated party may so state);
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 30 F.R.D. 358, 362 (D.R.I. 1962) (if answer unknown after
reasonably diligent search responding party should so state). If a party has no knowledge of
the information sought, he should so state in his response. See McKnight v. Blanchard, 667
F.2d 477, 481 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Nysco Laboratories, Inc., 26 F.R.D. 159, 162
(E.D.N.Y. 1960). Moreover, one should state the efforts made to obtain the requested information. See Miller v. Doctor's Gen. Hosp., 76 F.R.D. 136, 140 (W.D. Okla. 1977).
86. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(2)(e).
87. Compare id. with Tex. R. Civ. P. 186a (Vernon 1976).
88. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(2)(e).
89. 79 F.R.D. 444 (D. Alaska 1978).
90. See id. at 445.
91. See id at 446; see also Wright v. Jeep Corp., 547 F. Supp. 871, 874 (E.D. Mich.
1982) (discovery allowed because expert's study not developed in anticipation of trial and
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Neither the holding in Barkwell nor the new rule restrict the ability
to discover an expert's prior testifying and consulting experience in
other cases. 92
Rule 166b provides for three types of experts. One is the traditional testifying expert, an expert "who may be called as a witness." 93 A second type is the non-testifying consultant whose "work
product forms a basis either in whole or in part of the opinions of an
expert who is to be called as a witness." 94 The third type of expert is
the true consultant, one who has been "informally consulted" or
"retained or specially employed . . . in anticipation of litigation." 95
The redrafted rules allow discovery of the first two types of experts,
the testifying expert and the "contributing" expert; however, no discovery is allowed of a "non-contributing" expert. 96 ' Placing these
three divisions into a rule codifies existing Texas case law. 97
If the expert may be called as a witness or if the expert is a consultant whose work product forms the basis either in whole or in
part of the opinions of an expert who is to be called as a witness, a
party may discover the expert's
identity and location (name, address, and telephone number), .. the
subject matter on which the witness is expected to testify, the mental
impressions and opinions held by the expert and the facts known to
expert not retained by either party); Grinnell Corp. v. Hackett, 70 F.R.D. 326, 330-31
(D.R.I. 1976) (Federal Rule restricts discovery of facts and opinions of experts acquired in
anticipation of trial); Allen v. Humphreys, 559 S.W.2d 798, 804 (Tex. 1977) (scientific reports not made in connection with investigation of plaintiff's worker's compensation claim
discoverable). In Ex parte Shepperd, the Texas Supreme Court held that "an especially
rigorous showing of good cause would be required before a party to one pending action
could obtain reports immune from discovery in another pending action to which they primarily relate." Exparte Shepperd, 513 S.w.2d 813, 817 (Tex. 1974). Even though the good
cause requirement has since been deleted from the rules, a more demanding standard of
need may apply in contexts covered by Shepperd
92. See Barkwell v. Sturm Ruger Co., 79 F.R.D. 444, 445 (D. Alaska 1978); TEX. R.
Civ. P. 166b(2)(e).
93. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(2)(e)(l).
94. Id.
95. Id. 166b(3)(c). A true consultant's work product does not contribute to the basis of
the testifying expert's opinion or conclusions.
96. Id. 166b(2)(e)(I), (3)(c).
97. See, e.g., Werner v. Miller, 579 S.W.2d 455, 456 (Tex. 1979) (name of testifying
expert discoverable; opinions of consulting non-testifying experts not discoverable); Allen v.
Humphreys, 559 S.W.2d 798, 804 (Tex. 1977) (reports of consulting experts immune from
discovery); Houdaille Indus., Inc. v. Cunningham, 502 S.W.2d 544, 548 (Tex. 1973) (reports
of non-testifying experts not discoverable).
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the expert (regardless of when the factual information was acquired)
which relate to or form the basis of the mental impressions and opinions held by the expert.9 8

Subsection 2(e) of Rule 166b must be read in conjunction with
subsection 3(c), which exempts experts who have been "informally
consulted" and those "retained or specially employed by another
party in anticipation of litigation and preparation for trial."99 To
distinguish between a protected consultant and a non-protected consultant, the court must inquire into whether the expert's work product forms the basis, either in whole or in part, of the opinions of an
expert who may be called as a witness. If the work product is to be
used, the consultant necessarily was not "informally consulted";
otherwise, no discovery should be allowed. 1°°
The new rule embodies the holdings in Houdaille Industries, Inc.
v. Cunningham, ,' Allen v. Humphreys, 102 and Werner v. Miller 1°3

that a party may not discover the identity of a consulting expert if
the expert is one "used solely for consultation and who will not be
called as a witness." The ability to discover employee-experts, as
pronounced in Barker v. Dunham, 104 is in no way affected by the
1984 amendments. Therein, the court held that employee-experts
were subject to discovery in the same manner as other experts unless
the party-employer "positively avers" that the employee will not be
called as a witness. 105 Implicit in these holdings is the fact that an
expert who contributes to the basis of the testimony of the testifying
98. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(2)(e)(l).
99. Id 166b(3)(c).
100. Id Federal Rule 26(b)(4)(B) permits a party to discover the identity of experts
retained or specially employed, though non-testifying, under the general rule allowing discovery of persons having knowledge of relevant facts. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B). One may
not discover, however, the identity of experts who are informally consulted, but not specially
employed. See Arco Pipeline Co. v. S/S Trade Star, 81 F.R.D. 416, 417 (E.D. Pa. 1978);
Baki v. B.F. Diamond Constr. Co., 71 F.R.D. 179, 182 (D. Md. 1976). This construction of
the rule should not be adopted in Texas, considering the action of the supreme court with

regard to this rule.
101. 502 S.W.2d 544, 548 (Tex. 1973).

102. 559 S.W.2d 798, 804 (Tex. 1977).
103. 579 S.W.2d 455, 456 (Tex. 1979). These cases were based on the wording of Rule

186a, which protected experts "who will not be witnesses." Tex. R. Civ. P. 186a (Vernon
1976). These holdings remain intact even though the language of the rule has been reworded from the negative to the affirmative, so that you may discover experts "who may be
called as a witness." See TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(2)(e)(l).
104. 551 S.W.2d 41, 43-44 (Tex. 1977).
105. See id at 44.
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expert is not used "solely" for consultation and, thus, must be
disclosed.
One aspect of the expert rules that will require court construction
concerns the proper classification of a consultant who, although not
providing the sole basis for the testifying expert's testimony, contributes to the basis relied upon by the testifying expert. This problem
would arise when the expert has reached his conclusion, but the litigant seeks out other experts who subsequently conduct an investigation and contribute findings or data to be used by the testifying
expert. These experts do not supply the sole basis of the testifying
expert, but they may contribute to the basis of the testifying expert's
opinions. If the work product of such a consultant does not form at
least a partial basis of the opinions or conclusions of a testifying
expert, the consultant would, under the rule, be non-discoverable. 106
An interesting point that has not been addressed thoroughly by
Texas courts concerns what have been denominated "fact experts."
These are experts from whom information is sought concerning the
facts of the case, not expert opinion information. Many instances
arise in which only the inventors or developers of a product or idea
know the true facts of what has happened in a case. The federal
courts consistently have held that such experts do not fall within the
scope of the rules regarding experts, but rather that they are to be
treated as ordinary fact witnesses who may be discovered because
they have knowledge of relevant facts.° 7 The rule, however, should
not extend to consulting experts who will not testify or contribute to
the basis of the testimony of the testifying expert and whose only
source of factual information was the consultation.
Rule 166b sets forth guidelines controlling reports of experts that
are the same as those governing discovery of other information from
experts, i.e., all such information may be discovered if "it forms the
basis either in whole or in part of the opinions of an expert who is to
be called as a witness."' 10 8 The provision in former Rule 167(5) pro106. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(3)(c).
107. See, e.g., Marine Petroleum Co. v. Champlin Petroleum Co., 641 F.2d 984, 992

(D.C. Cir. 1979) (plaintiff entitled to discovery of facts known to energy consultant prior to
time he began preparation for defendant's trial); Keith v. Van Dorn Plastic Mach. Co., 86
F.R.D. 458, 460 (E.D. Pa. 1980) ("actor or viewer" of subject matter of lawsuit considered
fact witness); Nelco Corp. v. Slater Elec. Co., 80 F.R.D. 411, 414 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (informa-

tion acquired by expert as "actor" in transactions that concern lawsuit discoverable).
108. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(2)(e)(2); accord Allen v. Humphreys, 559 S.W.2d 798, 804
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viding for the reduction of experts' reports to tangible form is included in Rule 166b(2)(e)(4); however, the new rule omits the good
cause and hearing requirements. °9 The fourteen-day limit of Rule
168(7)(3) has been replaced by a provision giving the trial judge discretion to compel a party to make the determination and disclosure
of whether an expert may be called to testify within a reasonable
and specific time before the date of trial." 0 This provision will help
eliminate delay and surprise by allowing parties to ascertain prior to
trial what additional discovery is required to prepare adequately for
the case."'
The purpose of the new provisions governing the discoverability
of consulting experts and their work product is to make known to all
parties information necessary for them to adequately prepare for
trial and to avoid surprise and delay in trials." 1 2 It is contrary to the

spirit of the rule for a party to shield information from discovery by
having it developed through a consultant who will not testify, but
then making it available to the expert who will testify. While maintaining a policy of full disclosure, the rule continues to protect those
consultants whose work product actually does not form the basis of
another's testimony." 3 The test is: If the work product of the expert

(Tex. 1977) (legal duty to disclose reports of testifying expert witnesses). The trial court has
ample discretion to determine if adequate disclosure has been made and to order more if it
would facilitate the trial. See Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Hartz Mountain Indus., Inc., 553 F.
Supp. 45, 52 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
109. Compare Tex. R. Civ. P. 167(5) (Vernon Supp. 1983) (upon showing of good
cause, court may order expert data reduced to tangible form) with TEX. R. Civ.
P.166b(2)(e)(4) (reduction of expert report to tangible form; no good cause requirement).
110. Compare Tex. R. Civ. P. 168(7)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1983) (duty to supplement
names of testifying experts 14 days prior to trial) with TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(2)(e)(3) (status of
expert disclosed within reasonable time before trial).
111. Accord Werner v. Miller, 579 S.W.2d 455, 456 (Tex. 1979). The Werner court
stated:
This declaration obviously should be made in sufficient time to permit the opposing
party to discover the reports, factual observations, and opinions of the potential expert
witness. On the other hand, the party employing the witness must be given sufficient
time to develop his case so that an intelligent decision can be made regarding the use of
the expert.
Id at 456.
112. See Hockley v. Zent, Inc., 89 F.R.D. 26, 30 (M.D. Pa. 1980,). Inquiries regarding
experts are "designated to afford the questioner notice of the basic arguments the responding
litigant intends to press at trial." Id. at 30; see also Weiss v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 515
F.2d 449, 456-57 (2d Cir. 1975) (mutual knowledge of expert testimony essential to preparation of trial).
113. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(3)(c).
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in question forms a basis either in whole or in part of the opinions of
an expert who is to be called as a witness then you may discover the
identity, mental impressions, and opinions of the expert." 14
6.

Indemnity, Insurance and Settlement Agreements

The contents of former Rule 167(1)(a) allowing discovery of insurance agreements is retained in Rule 166b(f)(1)." 5 The new rule
additionally provides for the disclosure of the existence of settlement agreements." 6 This new subsection is consistent with the
practice in the federal courts." 7 The admissibility of such information, however, is controlled by the rules of evidence.' 8
7. Statements
Subsection 2(g) of Rule 166b is a verbatim recitation of former
Rule 167(6).' 9 This rule allows a person to obtain a copy of a state114. See id Under the Federal Rule regarding consulting experts, the rule is that "discovery can take place only upon a showing of 'exceptional circumstances' under which it is
'impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject
by other means'." Mantolete v. Bolger, 96 F.R.D. 179, 181 (D. Ariz. 1982) (citing Maine
Petroleum Co. v. Champlin Petroleum Co., 641 F.2d 984, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1980)); see also
Hoover v. United States Dep't of Interior, 611 F.2d 1132, 1142 (5th Cir. 1980) (landowner
not entitled to discovery of government's appraisal right without showing of "exceptional
circumstances"); Benton v. Dixie Shamrock Oil & Gas, Inc., 95 F.R.D. 296, 297 (E.D. Tenn.
1981) (deposition of non-testifying expert not allowed because no "exceptional circumstances"). A consulting expert remains protected if he is specially employed in anticipation
of numerous future lawsuits. And, such an expert also may be used for product improvement and not lose his protection. See Hermsdorfer v. American Motors Corp., 96 F.R.D.
13, 15 (W.D.N.Y. 1982).
115. Compare Tex. R. Civ. P. 167(l)(a) (Vernon Supp. 1983) (production of insurance
agreement under which insurer may be liable for part of judgment) with TEX. R. Civ. P.
166b(f)(l) (discovery of insurance agreement under which insurer may be liable to satisfy
judgment).
116. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(f)(2).
117. See Ayers v. Pastime Amusement Co., 240 F. Supp. 811, 812 (E.D.S.C. 1965)
(plaintiff entitled to discover true nature of settlement); Walling v. R.L. McGinley Co., 4
F.R.D. 149, 150 (E.D. Tenn. 1943) (production of settlements executed by defendant's employees in connection with settlement of claims allowed). See generally FEDERAL PROCEDURE § 26:233 (Bancroft-Whitney Co. Ed. 1982) (Federal Rule 34 allows production of
releases and covenants not to sue). Some courts require a particularized showing of a likelihood that admissible evidence will be generated by the dissimenation of the terms of the
settlement agreement. See Bottaro v. Hatton Assoc., 96 F.R.D. 158, 160 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
118. See TEX. R. EVID. 408-09, 411.
119. Compare TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(2)(g) (discovery of statement previously made) with
Tex. R. Civ. P. 167(6) (Vernon Supp. 1983) (discovery of statement perviously made).
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ment previously given by him to a party.,2 ° On the other hand,
Rule 166b(3)(b) states that written statements of potential parties
and witnesses are exempt from discovery. 121 Consequently, a witness or party who gives a statement can obtain a copy of his own
statement, but not a copy of the statement of another party or witness. 22 The federal courts generally allow a party to obtain a list of
persons who have given a statement in a case.' 23 When this question arises in a Texas tribunal, the court may consider the definition
of "persons having knowledge of relevant facts," the protection
granted to work product, and the exempt communications taking
124
place after the occurrence that forms the basis of the lawsuit.
8. Medical Records; Medical Authorization
The medical records section of Rule 167(7) has been modified and
transferred to Rule 166b(2)(h). 25 The new rule requires a written
request for the disclosure of such records. 126 As in the former rule,
the requesting party is required to furnish a copy of all records so
obtained to the person of whom the request was made.127 Contrary
to the former rule, however, no longer must this information be provided free of charge to all other parties. Rather, the information
need only be made available to parties, and they are responsible for
the costs of reproducing the records.' 28 Rule 166b also extends the
period before trial during which medical records must be made
available to parties and the furnishing party.' 29 This time period
120. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(2)(g).
121. See id 166b(3)(b).
122. See id. 166b(2)(g), (3)(b).
123. Cf. Sersted v. American Can Co., 535 F. Supp. 1072, 1080 (E.D. Wis. 1982)(defendant entitled to discover names and addresses of witnesses who gave statements); Ballard
v. Terrak, 58 F.R.D. 184, 185 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (defendant required to disclose names of
witnesses). But cf.Arco Pipeline Co. v. S/S Trade Star, 81 F.R.D. 416, 417-18 (E.D. Pa.
1978) (one may obtain copy of witnesses' statements by properly worded interrogatory).
124. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(2)(d), (3)(a), (3)(d).
125. Compare Tex. R. Civ. P. 167(7) (Vernon Supp. 1983) (party alleging injury required to disclose medical records) with TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(2)(h) (party alleging injury
required to produce or authorize disclosure of related medical records).
126. Id. 166b(2)(h).
127. See id
128. See id (records made available to parties "under reasonable terms and
conditions").
129. See id
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has been extended from fourteen days to thirty days. 30 In addition,
the rule specifically provides that mailing notice of the availability
of such records constitutes making them available.' 3 '
C. Exemptions

Section 3 of Rule 166b contains exemptions. 3 ' Subsection 3(a)
maintains the traditional work product exemption. 133 Written statements of potential witnesses and parties are protected by subsection
3(b).1 34 Subsection 3(b) also entitles a person to obtain a copy of his
own statement. 35 Consulting experts are addressed in subsection
3(c).136 Rule 166b(3)(e) exempts "any matter protected from disclothat
sure by privilege."' 37 This incorporates all types of privileges
138
186a.
Rule
former
under
valid
be
the courts have held to
The most notable change in exemptions is in Rule 166b(3)(d),
which exempts communications passing between a party and his
employees, agents, and investigators. 39 This provision is taken
from old Rule 186a.' 40 Rule 166b maintains the general exemption
regarding communications passing between agents, representatives,
or employees of any party "when made subsequent to the occurrence or transaction upon which the suit is based, and made in connection with the prosecution, investigation, or defense of the
130. Compare id 166b(2)(h) (thirty days) withTex. R. Civ. P. 167(7) (Vernon Supp.
1983) (fourteen days).
131. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(2)(h).
132. See id. 166b(3).
133. See id 166b(3)(a).
134. See id.166b(3)(b).
135. See id Section II, B, subsection 7(2)(g) of this article discusses the discoverability
of a list of persons who have given a statement in a case.
136. See id 166b(3)(c). The discoverability of consultants is discussed in conjunction
with rule 166b(2)(e) in section II, B, subsection 5 of this article.
137. Id 166b(3)(e).
138. See West v. Solito, 563 S.W.2d 240, 244 (Tex. 1978) (discovery rules encompass all
privileges under Texas law); Automatic Drilling Mach., Inc. v. Miller, 515 S.W.2d 256, 259
(Tex. 1974) (qualified privilege for trade secrets; discovery allowed when information material and unavailable from other source); Fisher v. Continental I11. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.,
424 S.W.2d 664, 671 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (discovery
of communications of attorney allowed because attorney-client privilege is privilege of client); General Commentary-1966, Tex. R. Civ. P. 186a (Vernon 1976) (common privileges are
attorney-client privilege and privilege against self-incrimination).
139. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(3)(d).
140. Compare id with Tex. R. Civ. P. 186a (Vernon 1976).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

21

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 15 [2022], No. 4, Art. 1

ST MAR Y'S LAW JO URNAL

[Vol. 15:713

claim."' 14 ' The rule omits the clause contained in Rule 186a that

exempted "information obtained in the course of an investigation of
by a person employed to make such
a claim or 1defense
42
investigation."
In Ex ParteHanlon, 113 the Texas Supreme Court interpreted Rule

186a literally and denied a request to depose an insurance investigator concerning information obtained by him in the course of his
work.44 This exemption has been omitted from the rule because of
its potential for abuse and because it arguably duplicated the exemption retained in Rule 166b(3)(d). As amended, Rule 166b provides ample protection for communications made in connection
with the "investigation of the occurrence or transaction out of which
the claim has arisen." 145
D. Protective Orders

Section 4 of Rule 166b includes a redrafted provision governing
protective orders. 146 Of note, the requirement of good cause previously set forth in Rule 186b has been omitted. The major change in
the form of this rule is the elimination of the specific acts that the
trial court may take and the inclusion of three broader, non-exclusive types of protective orders that may be made. 47 Although reworded, the new rule contemplates similar protective orders as were
148
available under the former rule.

141. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(3)(d).
142. Tex. R. Civ. P. 186a (Vernon 1976).
143. 406 S.W.2d 204 (Tex. 1966).

144. See id at 207.
145. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(3)(d).
146. See id. 166b(4).
147. See id. Rule 166b(4) provides:

a. ordering that requested discovery not be sought in whole or in part, or that the
extent or subject matter of discovery be limited, or that it not be undertaken at the time
or place specified.
b. ordering that the discovery be undertaken only by such method or upon such terms
and conditions or at the'time and place directed by the court.
c. ordering that results of discovery be sealed or otherwise adequately protected; that
its distribution be limited; or that its disclosure be restricted.

Id
148. Compare id with Tex. R. Civ. P. 186b (Vernon 1976). The trial court has broad

discretion to allow or deny discovery, and it should utilize protective orders when necessary
to prevent discovery abuses. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 893 (2d Cir. 1982), cert denied,
Baldwin v. Joy, - U.S. _ 103 S. Ct. 1498, - L. Ed. 2d - (1983).
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Whether or not a protective order is granted is within the discretion of the trial court. 149 Moreover, a protective order will not be set
aside except upon a showing of a clear abuse of discretion. 50 The
1984 rules enlarge and liberalize discovery in Texas. Because the
new rules enhance one's ability to seek discovery, it may be necessary for trial judges to be equally as liberal in granting protective
orders when appropriate to protect the rights of litigants. Often, it is
better to limit discovery at the outset rather than to attempt
to cure
5'
granted.'
been
has
discovery
once
an improper disclosure
E. Duty to Supplement
The final section of Rule 166b, section 5, concerns the duty to
supplement, formerly in Rule 168(7).152 This duty now applies to all
53
forms of discovery, not just to interrogatories and depositions.
When supplementation is required, it now must be made thirty days
154
prior to trial, not fourteen as under the former rule.
The grounds giving rise to a duty to supplement have been rewritten and broadened. The rule now demands that supplementation is
required if the initial response was either incorrect or incomplete
when made or if a correct and complete response later proves not to
be both true and correct and the circumstances are such that failure
to amend is in substance misleading. 5 5 If an expert is obtained by a
party and inquiry on that subject has been made previously, disclosure of the new expert is required. 56 The party who obtained the
expert must state the name, address, and telephone number of the
expert and the substance of the expert's testimony. 57 Except upon
leave of court, this information must be provided no less than thirty
149. See Fisher v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 424 S.W.2d 664, 670 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1968, writ refd n.r.e.).
150. See Meyer v. Tunks, 360 S.W.2d 518, 522 (Tex. 1962).
151. See generally West v. Solito, 563 S.W.2d 240, 246 (Tex. 1978) (judge should examine documents alleged to be privileged prior to production of documents); Automatic
Drilling Mach., Inc. v. Miller, 515 S.W.2d 256, 259-60 (Tex. 1974) (court should have sus-

tained plaintiffs protective order before ordering full disclosure of trade secrets).
152. Compare TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(5) withTex. R. Civ. P. 168(7) (Vernon Supp. 1983).
153. See id. 166b(5).

154. Compare id (thirty days prior to trial) with Tex. R. Civ. P. 168(7) (Vernon Supp.
1983) (fourteen days prior to trial).
155. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 166b(5)(a)(l)(2).
156. See id 166b(5)(b).
157. See id
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days prior to the beginning of trial; this is a modification of the fourteen-day period found in former Rule 168(7). Sanctions for the failure to disclose such experts are provided in Rule 215.158
III.

167. DISCOVERY AND PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
AND THINGS FOR INSPECTION, COPYING, OR
PHOTOGRAPHING

RULE

Substantial portions of Rule 167, which formerly contained information on the scope of discovery, have now been moved to Rule
166b. This was necessary to assure that all scope matters were included in one rule. In addition, former sections 5 (expert reports), 6
(statements), 7 (injury damages), and 8 (constructive possession) are
now incorporated into Rule 166b. 159 A portion of old section 3 dealing with sanctions has been moved to Rule 215.
The primary substantive change in Rule 167 is the addition of a
sentence to subsection 1(c), which reads: "The REQUEST shall set
forth the items to be inspected either by individual item or by category, and describe each item and category with reasonable particularity."' 6 ° This amendment places the same standard upon the
movant as the 1981 amendments placed on the respondent.
The wording of the new rule's "request" subsection is taken from
Federal Rule 34(a). 161 The nomenclature utilized in the rule, i.e.,
"individual item" or "category" evidences the intent of the drafters
as to the form the usual request should take. Construing the federal
rule, Professor Moore has concluded that "[tihe question is whether
a reasonable man would know what documents or things are called
for."' 62 The requirement of "reasonable particularity" is one not
susceptible to exact definition.' 63 Whether a particular request satis158. See id.215; see also Kilgarlin & Jackson, Sanctionsfor Discovery Abuse Under
New Rule 215, 15 ST. MARY'S L.J. 767, 816-20 (1984).
159. Compare Tex. R. Civ. P. 166b with id.167(5), (6), (7), (8) (Vernon Supp. 1983).
160. TEX. R. Civ. P. 167(1)(c).
161. Compare id.with FED. R. Civ. P. 34(a).
162. 4A D. EPSTEIN, J.LUCAS & J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 34.07 (2d
ed. 1983).
163. See Laufman v. Oakley Bldg. & Loan Co., 72 F.R.D. 116, 122 (S.D. Ohio 1976)
(production requests of "any and all documents" sufficient under Rule 34(b)); Mallinckrodt
Chem. Works v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 58 F.R.D. 348, 353-54 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) ("reason-

able particularity" defined in terms of identification).
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fies this test must be based upon the facts of each case,' 6 4 and the
trial judge is vested with broad discretion to adjudge the sufficiency
65
of one's request for production.
As a general rule, the courts scrutinize requests more closely if the
requests are not specific as to either the time, category, or item demanded. 166 Therefore, a request that covers an unspecified or overbroad time period may still be upheld if the items or categories are
described in detail. 167 Likewise, a request for items in which the
description is overbroad may be upheld if such request is limited to
68

a specific period of time.
The requirement of particularity is important since "vague or duplicative demands may cause confusion and disarray in responding"
to the request 69 and may lead to unnecessary court interference in
the discovery process. 7 ° The nature of the case often determines
the level of particularity required.' 7 ' For example, complex commercial litigation may provide the context for more general category
descriptions since the movant often will be unaware of the specific

164. See In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, 76 F.R.D. 420, 424 (N.D. 111.1977);
Mallinckrodt Chem. Works v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 58 F.R.D. 348, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
165. See Bowman v. General Motors Corp., 64 F.R.D. 62, 68 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
166. See Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. American Beryllium & Oil Corp., 47 F.R.D. 66,
68 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
167. See Houdry Process Corp. v. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 24 F.R.D. 58, 62-63
(S.D.N.Y. 1959) (designation by category proper if category sufficiently described); cf. Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394, 1396 (D.D.C. 1973) (subpoena of materials covering extended time period valid because items requested particularly specified).
168. See Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 75 F.R.D. 430, 431 (N.D. 111.1976);
Milner v. National School of Health Technology, 73 F.R.D. 628, 632 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
169. See United States v. International Business Machs. Corp., 83 F.R.D. 97, 107
(S.D.N.Y. 1979). Recognizing that instances will arise in which duplication in a request will
occur, it is advisable for the movant to include in his request an addendum directing that the
respondent make discovery with respect to that portion of the request to which the item is
primarily responsive. See id. at 107.
170. See Baise v. Alewel's, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 95, 98 (W.D. Mo. 1983) (request for contents
of expert's work file overbroad because probably contained work product and other privileged information). A vague or overbroad request invites an objection and needlessly involves the court in the discovery process.
171. Cf. Alexander v. Rizzo, 52 F.R.D. 235, 236 (E.D. Pa. 1971). In Alexander, the
plaintiffs brought a civil rights action to seek relief from police practices of engaging in mass
investigatory arrests. See id. at 235-36. The plaintiffs assumed the burden of showing that
the police department engaged in improper investigatory practices as a matter of policy. See
id at 236-38. The court weighed the plaintiffs need to obtain evidence and the burden upon
the defendant. The court ruled that the defendant was required to provide the plaintiff with
evidence concerning three specific investigations. The results of this discovery would form
the basis of a decision of the merits of the plaintiffs claim. See id at 236-38.
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documents in the possession of his opponent until after discovery
has been accomplished. 7 2 Thereafter, when initial discovery has
been completed and the parties have succeeded in narrowing the
issues to some extent, greater particularity justifiably may be required. 173 Similarly, in less complex lawsuits in which the very nature of the case renders requests susceptible to greater particularity,
the requesting party should act accordingly. Common sense will
play a primary role in establishing the parameters of permissible
requests under Rule 167.174
In ruling upon the sufficiency of a request for production, the
court also may wish to consider the burden of compliance. 175 "The
burden of production must be compared to the size of and resources
available to the responding party."' 176 This factor should not, however, give a party carte blanche to level unfairly overbroad requests
merely because his opponent has considerable financial or other resources. 17 7 Likewise, parties should not be allowed to hide behind
their lack of resources as a reason not to answer discovery. The
ability to respond is only one factor properly considered by the
court in determining whether a request is sufficiently particular.
172. See United States v. International Business Machs. Corp., 83 F.R.D. 97, 107
(S.D.N.Y. 1979).
173. The degree of specificity required depends partially upon the information one has
about the documents he requests. See Westhemeco Ltd. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 82
F.R.D. 702, 709-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
174. See United States v. International Business Machs. Corp., 83 F.R.D. 97, 107
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (in complex litigation, common sense dictates that description by categories
is sufficient); In re Hunter Outdoor Prods. Inc., 21 Bankr. 188, 192 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982)
(request for all documents that "show or tend to show that defendant is guilty" insufficiently
particularized and patently overbroad).
175. See Olmert v. Nelson, 60 F.R.D. 369, 370 (D.D.C. 1973); Casson Constr. Co. v.
Armco Steel Corp., 91 F.R.D. 376, 378 (D. Kan. 1980). The party resisting discovery must
show specifically how the request is burdensome. See Goodman v. Wagner, 553 F. Supp.
255, 258 (E.D.Pa. 1982).
176. United States v. International Business Machs. Corp., 83 F.R.D. 97, 108 (S.D.N.Y.
1979) ("inconvenience is relative to size").
177. See Halder v. International Tel. & Tel. Co., 75 F.R.D. 657, 658 (E.D.N.Y. 1977)
(although requests under defendant's control, defendant "should not be forced to engage in
extensive research and compilation"). Use of liberal discovery rules to "harass opponents is
common, and requires viligence of the district judges to prevent." Marrese v. American
Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 706 F.2d 1488, 1495 (7th Cir. 1983); see In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 97 F.R.D. 481, 484 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (discovery should not be used to
embarrass or annoy opponent); see alsoGoldman v. Belden, 98 F.R.D. 733, 736 (W.D.N.Y.
1983) (courts should not allow plaintiffs with groundless claims to abuse discovery simply to
obtain information to enhance settlement value of suit).
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The nature of the case and the nature of the movant's inquiry also
78
should be considered in ruling upon requests for production.1
This will require the trial judge to make an objective determination
of whether the requested information is of sufficient importance to
the disposition of the case to warrant imposing upon the respondent

the burden of producing the information. If the request in dispute
concerns a matter of incidental importance to the resolution of the
case, it will be more difficult to justify an extremely burdensome
response. 79 On the contrary, requests dealing with the central issues in a lawsuit may be granted with less justification.
If the court concludes that a request is not sufficiently particular,
it may deny the request altogether 80 or it may cut the request down
to a reasonable scope and grant it.' 8 ' Whether a request is denied or
cut down in scope is a matter in the discretion of the trial judge.'82
For example, in General Motors Corp. v. Lawrence, 183 the plaintiff
requested certain information concerning fuel spills as to all Gen-

eral Motors vehicles, and no time period was specified. 84 The
Texas Supreme Court concluded that the request was overbroad

178. See Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n-MEA-NEA, 556 F. Supp. 317, 318 (W.D.
Mich. 1983). "[Tjhe extent of a discovery burden that a party must justifiably bear is measured by the nature, importance, and complexity of the inquiry involved in a given case."
Id. at 318.
179. See Duncan v. Maryland, 78 F.R.D. 88, 96 (D. Md. 1978) (in employment discrimination suit, court considered nature of case and burden of compliance and limited
plaintiff's interrogatories to school at which plaintiff worked as opposed to all schools run by
defendant).
180. See Bowman v. General Motors Corp., 64 F.R.D. 62, 66 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (interrogatory requesting details of all patents owned by GM denied because overly broad); In re
Transtex Corp., 10 Bankr. 235, 240 (Bankr. Mass. 1981) (interrogatory requesting date, time,
and substance of conversations with each agent or employee of plaintiff denied because
overbroad).
181. See, e.g., Hinton v. Entex Inc., 93 F.R.D. 336, 337-38 (E.D. Tex. 1981) (in employment discrimination suit, discovery limited to facility where plaintiff was employed); Greene
v. Raymond, 41 F.R.D 11, 14-15 (D. Colo. 1966) (overbroad interrogatories limited as to
period of inquiry); Eaddy v. Little, 235 F. Supp. 1021, 1022 (E.D.S.C. 1964) (interrogatory
requesting plaintiff to list amount of annual earnings during past ten years overbroad and
thus, limited to five-year period).
182. See Tavoulareas v. Piro, 93 F.R.D. 35, 40 (D.D.C. 1981); In re IBM Peripheral
EDP Devices Antitrust Litigation, 77 F.R.D. 39, 41 (N.D. Cal. 1977);,Schultz v. Haxton, 50
F.R.D. 95, 98 (N.D. Miss. 1970); see also Clarostat Mfg., Inc. v. Alcor Aviation, Inc., 544
S.W.2d 788, 791 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, writ refd n.r.e.) (denial of motion for
production of documents not abuse of discretion).
183. 651 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. 1983).
184. See id at 732.
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and would have required the delivery of substantial information not
relevant to the case.' 85 Therefore, the court directed that the request
should be limited to General Motors trucks for the model years 1949
through 1972.186
On December 7, 1983, the Texas Supreme Court heard arguments
in Jampole v. Stovall, 187 an original mandamus action. This cause
of action involves a suit for products liability against General Motors. 88 Plaintiffs sought discovery of substantial items from General Motors, concerning fuel spills and post and pre-production test
data. Judge Stovall granted a portion of the request and instructed
89
plaintiffs to reapply if the discovery granted proved insufficient.
The outcome of this case will clarify the scope of such requests.
IV.

RULE 168:

INTERROGATORIES TO PARTIES

Very few changes were made in the substance of Rule 168, with
the exception of several deletions.' 90 The portions of the former rule
governing the duty to supplement and constructive possession are
now in Rule 166b.' 9' In addition, all sanctions are now contained in
Rule 215.192 Rule 168(5) maintains the limit upon the numbers of
answers that may be required in response to interrogatories. 193 The
thirty-answer limit imposed by the rule may be altered by agreement of the parties or court order. 194
A nominal change was made in the final sentence of subsection
2(b) of the rule. ' 95 The amendment concerns the "option to produce
185. See id.at 734.
186. See id.at 734.
187. Cause number C-2125. The Honorable Hugo Touchy recently has been named
Judge of the 129th District Court in Harris County, from which this cause originated. Judge
Touchy reaffirmed the order issued by Judge Stovall, and a motion to substitute Judge
Touchy in place of Judge Stovall was granted by the supreme court. Thus, this cause will be
disposed of under the style Jampole v. Touchy.
188. See id.
189. See id
190. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 168.
191. Id. 166b(2)(b), (5).
192. Id 215. Substantial changes were recommended in the area of sanctions, many of
which were based upon provisions previously included in rule 168. See Kilgarlin & Jackson, Sanctionsfor Discovery Abuse Under New Rule 215,15 ST. MARY'S L.J. 767 (1984).
193. TEX. R. Civ. P. 168 (5) (number of questions in set of interrogatories limited to no
more than thirty answers).
194. See id.
195. See id.168(2)(b).
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business records" section of the rule and provides: "The specification of records provided shall include sufficient detail to permit the
interrogating party to locate and to identify as readily as can the
party served, the records from which the answers may be ascertained."' 96 This provision corresponds closely with the final sentence of Federal Rule 33(c). 19 7 Few federal cases have construed
this provision, as it was added to the federal rule only in 1980. The
comment accompanying Rule 33(c), however, is informative:
A party who is permitted by the terms of this subdivision to offer
records for inspection.

. .

should offer them in a manner that permits

the same direct and economical access that is available to the party. If
the information sought exists in the form of compilations, abstracts or
summaries then available to the responding party, those should be
made available to the interrogating party. The final sentence is added
to make it clear that a responding party has the duty to specify, by
category and location, the records from which answers to interrogatories can be derived. 198
Thus, the specificity requirement is defined in terms of category and
location. This rule, however, providing the interrogated party with
the option to produce business records is not to be used to avoid
discovery or to shift the burden of determining whether the information sought exists; only the burden of sorting it out is shifted. '19 The
interrogated party must respond that the information sought is or is
not in specified records. When sorting through the records would be
equally burdensome on2 both parties the requesting party is required
to assume the burden. 00
V.

RULE 169: ADMISSIONS OF FACTS AND OF GENUINENESS OF
DOCUMENTS

Numerous changes were made in the substance of Rule 169.2 l
Most of these changes were adopted from Federal Rule 36, and the
two rules are now substantially the same.2 °2 The first change in the
196. Id.
197. Compare id with FED. R. Civ. P. 33(c).
198. FED. R. Civ. P. 33(c) advisory committee note to 1980 amendment.
199. See In re Master Key, 53 F.R.D. 87, 90 (D. Conn. 1971).
200. See Mid-America Facilities, Inc. v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 78 F.R.D. 497, 498 (E.D.
Wis. 1978); Technitrol, Inc. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 62 F.R.D. 91, 93 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
201. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 169.
202. Compare id with FED. R. Civ. P. 36.
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rule concerns the scope of requests for admissions. Previously, a
request could be made as to any "relevant matter. 2 °3 The amended
rule omits this term and states that scope is controlled by Rule
166b. 2°
Rule 169 now allows requests concerning documents not furnished to the opposing party, but "made available for inspection or
copying."205 Thus, some additional burden may be placed on the
respondent to secure copies of documents that are the subject of a
request.
The period after which a response to a request for admissions is
required has been lengthened from "not less than ten days" to
"within thirty days.120 6 The thirty-day limit is consistent with other
time changes in the discovery rules. One exception to this time limit
concerns a defendant who has been served with requests immediately after the filing of suit. In this situation, the answers are due
within thirty days after being served or within forty-five days after
service of the citation and petition, whichever is longer.20 7 As in the
prior rule, each of these time limits is subject to being altered by
court order.
The procedure for serving and responding to requests has been
altered under the 1984 amendments. It is no longer required that
the request specify that it is made under Rule 169.208 Requests for
admissions now must "separately set forth" each matter of which an
admission is requested. 20 9 This specificity requirement corresponds
with the burden placed upon the respondent. A specific request
comports with the purpose of the rule, which is "to avoid the necessity of proving facts which are not controverted and which are peculiarly within the knowledge of or readily ascertainable to the party
litigant of whom admissions are requested. '210 Therefore, requests
203. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 169 (Vernon 1976).
204. See id 169(1); see also supra text accompanying notes 5-37 (requests of mixed
questions of law and facts). See generally Bush, Rule 169. An Overview, 44 TEX. B.J. 1049
(1981) (general discussion of Rule 169 and pre-1984 cases on questions of law).
205. TEX. R. Civ. P. 169(1).

206. Compare id. with Tex. R. Civ. P. 169 (Vernon 1976).
207. TEX. R. Civ. P. 169(1); cf. 4A D. EPSTEIN, J. LUCAS & J. MOORE, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE $ 36.05[4] (2d ed. 1983) (discussion of time period for filing response to

requests for admissions under Federal Rule 36).
208. TEX. R. Civ. P. 169.
209. See id 169(1).
210. Texas Gen. Indem. Co. v. Lee, 570 S.W.2d 231, 233 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
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generally should be worded in such a way that they may be answered by a simple "yes" or "no" answer.2 1 If this is not practicable, the request should be in "simple and concise terms in order that
it can be denied or admitted with an absolute minimum of explana212
tion or qualification.

If no response is made within the required time limit and if no
motion for an extension is made by the responding party, the matters are conclusively established "without the necessity of a court
order.

' 2 13

In the past, there has been some confusion as to the effect

of an answer or a motion for an extension of time when the answer
or motion is made after the termination of the time limit to respond.21 4 The purpose of the rule and the amendment thereto evidence an intent that requests for admissions are established upon
the expiration of the time limit unless a motion for an extension is
receivedprior to the due date. Once a request for admissions is established, section 2 of Rule 169 provides that the court may, on mo2 15
tion, permit the withdrawal or amendment of the admission.
The procedure established in the rule is clear. If a response is not
received by the due date, the matters in question are deemed admitted; no court order is required.2 1 6 The responding party's recourse
thereafter is to move the court to allow withdrawal or amendment of
1978), writ refd n.r.e. per curiam,584 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. 1979); see Masten v. Masten, 165
S.W.2d 225, 227 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1942, writ refd).
211. See Johnstone v. Cronlund, 25 F.R.D. 42, 46 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
212. Havenfield Corp. v. H & R Block, Inc., 67 F.R.D. 93, 96 (W.D. Mo. 1973).
213. TEX. R. Civ. P. 169(1); accord Elkins v. Jones, 613 S.W.2d 533, 534 (Tex. Civ.

App.-Austin 1981, no writ). Admissions under Rule 169 have been interpreted to be "legal
admissions," such as a statement in one's pleadings. See Agristor Credit Corp. v. Donahoe,
568 S.W.2d 422, 427 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
214. Compare Bynum v. Shatto, 514 S.W.2d 808, 810-11 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1974, no writ) (motion for extension of time allowed after time limit expired) and
Schlindler v. Ag Areo Distribs., Inc., 502 S.W.2d 581, 584 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1973, no writ) (no abuse of trial court's discretion in granting motion for extension of time
after time limit expired) with Trevino v. Central Freight Lines, Inc., 613 S.W.2d 356, 359
(Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981, no writ) (no answer, then matters are deemed admitted; motion for extension required) and Packer v. First Tex. Say. Ass'n, 567 S.W.2d 574, 575 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Eastland 1978, writ refd n.r.e.) (no response before time period expired; requests deemed admitted by default).
215. TEX. R. Civ. P. 169(2).

216. Cf Milene Music, Inc. v. Gotauco, 551 F. Supp. 1288, 1292 (D.R.I. 1982) (if party
fails to answer or object to requests under Federal Rule 36, requests deemed admitted);
Weva Oil Corp. v. Belco Petroleum Corp., 68 F.R.D. 663, 666 (N.D.W.Va. 1975) (failure to
respond to requests for admissions is deemed admission of facts set forth).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

31

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 15 [2022], No. 4, Art. 1

ST MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 15:713

the admission.21 7 Although the time limits of Rule 169 appear to be
mandatory, the trial court has great discretion in discovery matters. z1 8 Trial judges should strive to require compliance with Rule
169's time limits, while utilizing their discretion to allow withdrawal
or amendment when fairness so dictates.
A sworn response is no longer required by Rule 169. As
amended, a written answer or objection will suffice. 2 19 Any objection must be accompanied by a reason therefore. If the movant is of
the opinion that the objection is well taken, he may do nothing. If
the movant wishes to challenge the propriety of the objection, he
may move to determine the sufficiency of the objection under Rule
215(4)(b). 22 ' Rule 215 specifically states that "an evasive or incomplete answer may be treated as a failure to answer. ' ' 22' It would be
in keeping with the purpose of Rule 169 to treat evasive objections
similarly.222
Rule 169(1) provides that an objection is improper if based solely
upon the contention that the matter in question presents a genuine
issue for trial.22 3 Rather, in such an instance, the party upon whom
the request is served should either deny the matter or set forth reasons why he cannot admit or deny it, as provided in Rule 215(3).224
Under the prior practice, it was common for a party to deny an
entire request if any part of it properly was subject to a denial.
Moreover, it was not unusual for a party to deny a request based
upon a subjective, strained interpretation of what the request sought
to establish. These practices are no longer allowed by the rule, as it
provides: "A denial shall fairly meet the substance of the requested
217. TEX. R. Civ. P. 169(2). If some response is filed by the due date, the court may be
more lenient in allowing an amendment thereto. See In re Kaltenbach, 28 Bankr. 337, 339
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983).
218. See Sanders v. Harder, 148 Tex. 593, 597, 227 S.W.2d 206, 208 (1950); Mathes v.
Kelton, 565 S.w.2d 78, 81-82 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo), af'd, 569 S.W.2d 876, 878 (Tex.
1978). Section 2 of the rule contains two prerequisites to the withdrawal or amendment of
an admission, but the court has considerable discretion in determining if these prerequisites
have been met. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 169(2).
219. See id.169(1).
220. Id. 215(4)(b).
221. Id.
222. See Asea, Inc. v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 669 F.2d 1242, 1245-47 (9th Cir.
198 1) (failure to comply with literal requirements of rule justifies deeming requested matters
admitted).
223. TEX. R. Civ. P. 169(1).
224. See id 169(1), 215(3).
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admission, and when good faith requires that a party qualify his
answer or deny only a part of the matter of which an admission is
requested, he shall specify so much of it as is true and qualify or
'
deny the remainder."225
The respondent now is required to ascertain the "essential truth" and the substance of the request.226 This
provision evidences "the drastic character of the burden placed
upon the one to whom the request is made. It is clear, unambigu227
ous, unequivocal and means what it says.
The final substantive change in Rule 169 is the inclusion of a sentence that "[a]n answering party may not give lack of information or
knowledge as a reason for failure to admit or deny unless he states
that he has made reasonable inquiry and that the information
known or easily obtainable by him is insufficient to enable him to
admit or deny. '228 This proviso was adopted from Federal Rule
36(a). 229 The federal courts have interpreted Rule 36(a) to meet
those situations in which the responding party justifiably is unable
to obtain the information necessary to respond to the request.23 ° In
such a case, the response should state that a reasonable inquiry has
been made, and the party possesses insufficient information to allow
him to formulate a proper response. 23' Federal law holds that the
failure to include this in a response constitutes a failure to comply
with the rule and may subject the respondent to sanctions or
deemed admissions.232 The mere inclusion of this declaration in a
response, however, will not suffice. The trial judge must determine
225. Id 169(1).
226. See id,"see also Havenfield v. H & R Block, Inc., 67 F.R.D. 93, 97 (W.D. Mo.

1973) (plaintifi's evasive answers to requests deemed admitted because do not respond to
"essential truth" or substance of requests).
227. Havenfield v. H & R Block, Inc., 67 F.R.D. 93, 97 (W.D. Mo. 1973) (quoting
Dulansky v. Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co., 92 F. Supp. 118, 123 (S.D. Iowa 1950).
228. TEX. R. Civ. P. 169(1). Presumably, the amended rule incorporates the pre-1984
standard, i.e., a request extends to matters "within the knowledge of or readily ascertainableby the litigant of whom the request is made." See Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 490 S.w.2d 818, 825 (Tex. 1972) (emphasis in original).
229. FED. R. Civ. P. 36(a).
230. See Ranger Ins. Co. v. Culberson, 49 F.R.D. 181, 183 (N.D. Ga. 1969) (if cannot

reasonably obtain information, respondent may set forth facts showing inability to answer
requested information); Anderson v. United Air Lines, Inc., 49 F.R.D. 144, 149 (S.D.N.Y.

1969) (responses to requests must be based on information within respondent's knowledge or
ascertainable by reasonable inquiry).
231. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 169(1); see also Stewart v. Vaughn, 504 S.W.2d 600, 602 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, no writ).
232. See City of Rome v. United States, 450 F. Supp. 378, 383-84 (D.D.C. 1978); Adley
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whether, in fact, the respondent has made a good-faith attempt to
secure the information necessary to allow him to formulate a response.233 The overriding consideration is the nebulous concept of
good faith. 234 Further, even in those instances in which a party in
good faith is unable to answer the inquiry, the federal courts require
the response
to be accompanied by specific reasons in support
235
thereof.
Section 2 of Rule 169 is basically unchanged by the 1984 amendments.236 As discussed above, if no response is received within the
allotted time, the matters are deemed admitted, and no court action
is required. Thereafter, the respondent may move the court to allow
withdrawal or amendment of the admissions. Two prerequisites
must be met to allow withdrawal or amendment. First, the court
must find that such action would promote the presentation of the
merits of the action. Second, the party who obtained the admission
must fail to satisfy the court that withdrawal or amendment will
prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense on the merits.
The first factor implicitly places the burden on the party seeking
withdrawal or amendment to convince the court that withdrawal or
amendment will promote the presentation of the merits of the
case.237 Thereafter, the burden is placed upon the requesting party
to show prejudice.238
"The prejudice contemplated by the [r]ule is not simply that the
party who initially obtained the admission will now have to conExpress Co. v. Highway Truck Drivers & Helpers, Local No. 107, 349 F. Supp. 436, 451-52
(E.D. Pa. 1972).
233. See Asea, Inc. v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 669 F.2d 1242, 1247 (9th Cir. 1981).
234. See Criterion Music Corp. v. Tucker, 45 F.R.D. 534, 536 (S.D. Ga. 1968) (good
faith shown because ascertainment of information not within immediate reach of answering

party).
235. See Cada v. Costa Line, Inc., 95 F.R.D. 346, 348 (N.D. I11.
1982); United States v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 83 F.R.D. 323, 333 (D.D.C. 1979).
236. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 169(2).

237. In federal court, withdrawal does not require a showing of excuseable neglect, but
the movant must provide some explanation for his failure to respond. See Jones v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 96 F.R.D. 227, 230 (N.D. Ga. 1982). There is authority in Texas that the
party seeking withdrawal or amendment must show a "legal or equitable" excuse to avoid
the effect of deemed admissions. See Mathes v. Kelton, 565 S.W.2d 78, 81 (Tex. Civ. App.Amarillo 1977), aft'd, 569 S.W.2d 876, 878 (Tex. 1978); Burnett v. Cory Corp., 352 S.W.2d
502, 507 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1961, writ refd n.r.e.)

238. See St. Regis Paper Co. v. Upgrade Corp., 86 F.R.D. 355, 357 (W.D. Mich. 1980)
(plaintiff failed to show prejudice; defendant allowed to amend admissions).
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vince the fact finder of its truth. Rather it relates to the difficulty a
party may face in proving its case."239 The example given by one
federal court is difficulty that may arise because of the "unavailability of a key witness" and "the sudden need to obtain evidence with°
respect to the questions previously answered by the admission. "24
In deciding the question of prejudice, the federal courts generally
attempt to strike a balance between the interests of justice and dili" '
gence in litigation.24
VI.

RULE

188: DEPOSITIONS IN FOREIGN JURISDICTIONS

This is a new rule intended to provide guidance in interstate and
international litigation.242 Section 1 of the rule establishes four
methods for taking written or oral depositions: (1) a customary notice-type deposition under Texas law or the law of the jurisdiction in
which the deposition is held; (2) a deposition before a court-appointed commissioner; (3) pursuant to a letter interrogatory or a letter of request; or (4) pursuant to the terms of any treaty or
convention.243
Section 2 expounds on the commission pursuant to which a deposition may be taken. 244 This commission is directed to all authorized deposition officers and states that such officer immediately
should issue a subpoena to the deponent informing him of the time
and place of the deposition. The officer shall then take the deposition and return it to the clerk of the issuing court.
The procedure for a deposition pursuant to a letter interrogatory
is set forth in section 3.245 The rule states that the letter interrogatory shall be addressed to the appropriate authority in the state in
which the deposition is to be taken. This officer is to summon the
239. Brook Village North Ass'n v. General Elec. Co., 686 F.2d 66, 70 (lst Cir. 1982);
see Weva Oil Corp. v. Belco Petroleum Corp., 68 F.R.D. 663, 667 (N.D.W. Va. 1975)
(prejudice exists if withdrawal would require lengthy, laborious, and costly proof by party
who obtained admission).
240. Brook Village North Ass'n v. Elec. Co., 686 F.2d 66, 70 (1st Cir. 1982).
241. See Hadra v. Herman Blum Consulting Eng'rs, 74 F.R.D. 113, 114 (N.D. Tex.
1977).
242. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 188. See generally Bishop, International Litigation in Texas.ObtainingEvidence in Foreign Countries, 19 Hous. L. REV. 361, 385-97 (1982) (discussion of

practical problems of pretrial discovery in foreign jurisdictions).
243. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 188(1).
244. See id 188(2).
245. Id. 188(3).
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deponent, cause the deposition to be taken and reduced to writing,
and return it to the court from which the letter interrogatory issued.
A similar procedure is established in section 4 for a deposition pursuant to a letter of request.246
Finally, Rule 188(5) provides for the waiver of defects in taking
the deposition.247 The inference may be drawn that the waiver provisions of Rules 204(4) and 207(3) would apply to depositions taken
under Rule 188.248
VII.

RULE

200:

DEPOSITIONS UPON ORAL EXAMINATION

Frequent complaints have been leveled at the manner in which
the provisions governing discovery are scattered in innumerable
places throughout the rules. The guidelines that control depositions
previously suffered from this problem more than any of the other
discovery rules. The 1984 amendments should help eliminate this
problem.
A major improvement has been made in setting forth all deposition rules in the order in which they would be used by the practitioner. Following this scheme, Rule 200 governs oral depositions
and outlines the notice requirements for such depositions. 24 9 Rule

200 provides that an oral deposition may be taken "[a]fter commencement of the action.

'20

This statement must be read in light

of the next clause, which states that leave of court to take a deposition must be obtained "only if a party seeks to take a deposition

prior to the appearance day of any defendant."' 25' Construing these

two provisions together, the trial court may allow a party to serve
notice of an oral deposition prior to the appearance day of the defendant as long as the actual date of the taking of the deposition is
after appearance day. If the party desires to take the deposition
prior to2 appearance day, he must move the court for permission to
25
do So.
246. See id 188(4).
247. See id 188(5).
248. See id. 204(4), 207(3).
249.
250.
251.
252.

See id. 200.
Id. 200(1).
Id. 200(1)
Analogizing to the law of preliminary injunctions, the court in Notaro v. Koch

held that the following four requirements must be met to obtain expedited discovery:
(I) irreparable injury, (2) some probability of success on the merits, (3) some connec-
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Formerly, Rule 186b required a sworn motion showing good
cause to take a deposition prior to appearance day.253 The good
cause requirement has been omitted under the amended rule. In
addition, the Texas Supreme Court Advisory Committee considered
including in Rule 200 two exceptions to the "appearance day" limitation. The first exception would have allowed depositions to be
taken if the plaintiff filed a motion supported by an affidavit showing good cause for taking the deposition prior to appearance day. A
second exception contemplated by the Advisory Committee would
have allowed the taking of a deposition if the defendant had served
a notice of taking a deposition or otherwise sought discovery. Both
of these provisions were omitted from the final rule by the supreme
court. 25 4 The conclusion may be made that the court wished to allow the trial judge to determine the fairness of allowing a deposition
prior to appearance day without regard to any specific exceptions
stated in the rule.
Following the practice in the federal rules, subsection 2(a) of Rule
200 provides that "reasonable" notice is required for taking a deposition.255 The traditional ten-day requirement has been abandoned.
Many of the changes in the rules are based upon the assumption
that adversaries will act in good faith in litigation, and that allowing
parties more control over the manner in which they conduct their
cases will be more conducive to the full and fair adjudication of
issues. Abuses of this provision properly are dealt with in Rule
215.256

Former Rule 200 demanded that notice be sent only to the party
whose deposition was sought. 257 Today, multi-party litigation is extremely common. Recognizing this fact, Rule 200 now provides that
notice of the proposed deposition also must be served upon "every
tion between the expedited discovery and the avoidance of the irreparable injury, and
(4) some evidence of the injury that will result without expedited discovery looms
greater than the injury that the defendant will suffer if the expedited relief is granted.
Notaro v. Koch, 95 F.R.D. 403, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). This is a rather harsh set of requirements, but it may prove useful in Texas practice.
253. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 186(b) (Vernon 1976).
254. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 200.
255. Compare id 200(2)(a) with FED. R. Ov.P. 30(b)(l).
256. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(2); see also id 166b(4) (allowance of protective orders for
abuses of discovery).
257. See id 200 (Vernon 1976).
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'
other party or his attorney of record."258
Rule 200(2)(b) concerns oral depositions of corporations, partnerships, associations, and governmental agencies. 259 The party proposing to take the deposition is now required to describe with
reasonable particularity the matters on which examination is requested. 260 The designation of who is to give testimony for the organization, formerly in Rule 200, is now incorporated into Rule

201.261

Finally, the provision formerly contained in Rule 186 concerning
diligence in obtaining the deposition of a witness has been moved to
Rule 252.262 The Texas Supreme Court considered this proper, as
this question arises primarily in the contexts of motions for continuance. Only minor textual changes were made in the rule, and its
interpretation should remain the same as under the former rule.
VIII.

RULE 201. COMPELLING APPEARANCE; PRODUCTION OF
DOCUMENTS AND THINGS; DEPOSITION OF
ORGANIZATION

The substance of Rule 201 remains the same as in the former rule,
with the majority of the changes relating to grammar and terminology, along with the changes necessary to conform Rule 201 to Rule
166b. 26 3 In section 1, the reference to Article 2324b 264 has been deleted; instead, reference should now be made to Rule 208(4) for a
specification of who is a proper, authorized party to issue a
2 65

subpoena.

In section 2, the parenthetical in the former rule that enumerated
what "designated documents" could be requested has been de258. Id 200(2)(a).
259. See id 200(2)(b).
260. See id 200(2)(b). This language is found in FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) and incorporates the specificity requirement formerly contained in the final paragraph of Rule 189.
261. TEX. R. Civ. P. 201.
262. Id 252.
263. See id. 201.
264. See id 201(1); see also TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2324b (Vernon Supp. 19821983) (regulation of court reporters).
265. TEX. R. Civ. P. 208(4). Rule 208(4) provides that "[any person authorized to
administer oaths including notaries public (whether or not the person is a certified shorthand
reporter), is an officer who is authorized to issue a subpoena or a subpoena duces te" Id.
cum ..
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leted.2 66 Consistent with the analogous provisions of other rules,
Rule 201 now simply makes reference to Rule 166b's scope guidelines. Similarly, section 3 now provides that a party may be compelled to produce documents pursuant to a Rule 201(2) request "if
the notice sets forth the individual items or categories of items to be
produced with reasonable particularity. 267
Section 4 of amended Rule 201 complements Rule 200(2)(b) in
setting forth the mechanism for designating who will testify if the
deponent is a corporation, partnership, association, or governmental
entity.268 Depending on the statement in the notice of matters to be
inquired about, the deponent designates the person or persons who
will testify as to each matter or inquiry. 269 The deponent then di-

rects those persons to appear at the proper time and place to give
their testimony.27 °
Section 5, regarding the time and place of taking a deposition, has
been amended slightly. 27' The change concerns persons designated
pursuant to section 4. Rule 201(5) proposes that the county of suit is
a reasonable place at which to take such persons' depositions only if
the deponent-organization is a party. 272 If the deponent-organization is a non-party, the deposition should be taken at a reasonable
place, as that term is defined in Rule 201.273
266. Compare id.201 with Tex. R. Civ. P. 201 (Vernon Supp. 1983).
267. Id 201(3).
268. See id.201(4).
269. See id.at 201(4). If the notice designates the matters of inquiry with reasonable
particularity, the court may order a corporation to designate and produce the witnesses who
will testify at the depositions. See Tietz v. Textron, Inc., 94 F.R.D. 638, 639 (E.D. Wis.
1982). It is important to remember that the information and knowledge of a corporation's
agents are imputed to the corporation and its designated witness. See Casson Constr. Co. v.
Armco Steel Corp., 91 F.R.D. 376, 381 (D. Kan. 1980).
270. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 201(4).
271. See id.201(5).
272. Id 201(5). Reporter's Note to Amended Rule 201. The rule makes reference to
the protective orders section of Rule 166b. Specifically, Rule 166b(4)(b) provides that the
court may order that "the discovery be undertaken only ... at the time and place directed
by the court." Id. 166b(4)(b).
273. Id 201(5) (reasonable places are county of witness' residence, county of employment, county where witness regularly transacts business, or other convenient place).
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202: NON-STENOGRAPHIC RECORDING; DEPOSITION
BY TELEPHONE

The primary source of new Rule 202 is former Rule 215c. 274 Minor changes have been made in the language used in the new rule.275
Also, the format of the rule was changed from that of Rule 215c,
and the protective orders language in Rule 215c(d) was deleted.
An additional section, which was adopted from Federal Rule
30(b)(7), was included in Rule 202.276 As amended, the rule
provides:
The parties may stipulate in writing, or the court may upon motion,

order that a deposition be taken by telephone. For the purposes of
this rule and Rules 201, 215-la, and 215-2a, a deposition taken by
telephone is taken in the district and at the place where the deponent
is to answer questions propounded to him.277
Federal Rule 30 was amended to provide for depositions by telephone in 1980, and few cases have arisen construing the rule's provisions.278 The notes of the United States Supreme Court Advisory
Committee state: "The final sentence is added to make it clear that
when a deposition is taken by telephone it is taken in the district and
at the place where the witness is to answer the questions rather than
where the questions are propounded. ' 279 This directive correlates
with Rules 215(l)(a) and 215(2)(a) regarding the proper court in
which to apply for sanctions. 8°
X.

RULE 203: FAILURE OF PARTY OR WITNESS To ATTEND OR
To SERVE SUBPOENA; EXPENSES

Section 1 of Rule 203 is a verbatim recital of the provisions of
former Rule 215b(l). 281 ' Rule 203(1) provides for the payment of
274. Compare id 202 with Tex. R. Civ. P. 215c (Vernon 1976).
275. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 202. The rule substituted "other than stenographic" for "non-

stenographic" and "stenographic transcription" for "written record." The probable purpose
of these changes was to broaden and update the language of the rule. Moreover, the rule's
new vernacular is consistent with that in use in the Federal Rules. See FED. R. Civ. P.

30(b)(4).
276. See FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(7).
277. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 202(2).

278. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(7).
279. FED. R. Civ. P. 30 advisory committee note to 1980 amendment.
280. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(1)(a).

281. Compare id 203(1) with Tex. R. Civ. P. 215b(l) (Vernon 1976).
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expenses and attorney's fees if a party gives notice of the taking of a
deposition and subsequently fails to attend.282
Section 2 of Rule 203 is taken from former Rule 215b(2), but it
has been modified. 283 The prior provision concerning failure to
serve a subpoena upon a witness has been deleted.284 This language
originally was adopted from the federal rules.285 Considering the
fact that subpoenas are not used to compel the attendance of all
deposition witnesses,286 it was improper to word the rule on the basis of a failure to serve a subpoena. Thus, the subpoena language
was deleted, and a "fault" standard was substituted to determine the
culpability of the party noticing the deposition when the witness
fails to appear.287
The language of amended Rule 203 provides the trial judge with
discretion to determine whether a party has been sufficiently recalcitrant to require such party to reimburse another party for expenses
and attorney's fees. The trial judge, therefore, may award costs in a
clear case of nonfeasance or misfeasance in obtaining the presence
of the witness, and he may deny such an award when the absence of
the witness is beyond the control of the party responsible for setting
up the deposition or is due to excuseable neglect.288
XI.

RULE 204. EXAMINATION,

CROSS-EXAMINATION, AND

OBJECTIONS

Rule 204 evidences an attempt on the part of the Texas Supreme
Court to combine several short, fragmented rules related to the taking of oral depositions into one more easily understandable rule. As
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.

See TEX. R. Civ. P. 203(1).

Compare id 203(2) with Tex. R. Civ. P. 215b(2) (Vernon 1976).
See TEX. R. Civ. P. 215b(2) (Vernon 1976).
See FED. R. Civ. P. 30(g).
Reporter's Note to Amended Rule 203.
See TEX. R. Civ. P. 203(2).

288. See, e.g., Cronin v. Midwestern Okla. Dev. Auth., 619 F.2d 856, 864 (10th Cir.
1980) (failure to proceed with deposition sufficient to require party giving notice to reimburse other party for reasonable expenses incurred in attending deposition); Fino v. McCollum Mining Co., 93 F.R.D. 455, 459 (N.D. Tex. 1982) (plaintiff required to pay defendant
for expenses incurred on discovery junket in Ecuador because only four of ten noticed witnesses appeared at deposition); National Acceptance Co. of Am. v. Doede, 78 F.R.D. 333,

337 (W.D. Wis. 1978) (plaintiff awarded costs and attorney's fees because deponent's failure
to appear was due to defendant's failure to subpoena him).
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amended, Rule 204 contains four sections. 289 These four sections
contain the substance of former Rules 204-207.290 In addition, the
amended rule is written in a manner more conducive to a proper
understanding of its intended effects and purposes.
Section 1 is clarified to the extent that it states that written crossquestions are to be served upon the party proposing to take the deposition, and the deposing party then is responsible for transmitting
the cross-questions to the deposition officer for presentation to the
witness. 291 As in the former rule, cross-questions must be served
upon the deposing party within ten days from the date of the service
of notice of the taking of the deposition as provided for in Rule
200.292

Former rule 200 imposed a mandatory ten-day notice requirement for taking a deposition.293 As discussed in section VII of this
paper, amended Rule 200 was modified to require only "reasonable" notice. 294 Although the ten-day requirement has been omitted
from Rule 200, Rules 200 and 204 may be construed to require that
the party wishing to submit cross-questions be given ten days in
which to submit such questions. Therefore, in those instances in
which cross-questions are used, Rule 204 may impliedly reimpose
the ten-day notice requirement for taking a deposition. Parties generally will work out this timing problem in an amicable manner.
Only cosmetic changes were made in sections 2 and 3. Section 3
now explicitly provides that the oral testimony of the witness shall
be recorded at the time it is given and thereafter transcribed by the
deposition officer or some person under his supervision.295 The former rule's provision permitting the deponent to reduce the testimony to writing has been omitted, as has the statement regarding
the necessity of the deponent subscribing the written
transcription.296
Rule 204(4) makes a substantial modification in Texas practice.
289. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 204(1)-(4).
290. Compare id 204(1)-(4) with Tex. R. Civ. P. 204-207 (Vernon 1976).
291. TEX. R. Civ. P. 204(1).
292. Compare id with Tex. R. Civ. P. 204 (Vernon 1976).

293. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 200 (Vernon 1976).
294. TEX. R. Civ. P. 200(2)(a).
295. See id 204(3).
296. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 206 (Vernon 1976). The requirement regarding the witness's

signature on the transcribed deposition is incorporated into amended Rule 205. See id
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As amended, section 4 provides: "Except in the case of objections to
the form of questions or the nonresponsiveness of answers, which
objections are waived if not made at the taking of an oral deposition, the court shall not be confined to objections made at the taking
of the testimony. ' 297 Prior to the amendment to Rule 204, a party
could withhold objections to the form of the questions or answers.
These objections would be lost only if the deposition was filed one
day prior to trial and written objections with notice to the opposing
party again were not made before trial commenced. 298 Moreover,
former Rule 214 stated that nonresponsive matters included within
a deposition, which were not pertinent, were considered surplusage
and could be stricken upon objection thereto.299
Amended Rule 204(4) was intended to facilitate the use of depositions at trial by requiring that form and manner objections be made
at a time when the deposing party could correct them or else they
are waived. 3°° Many practitioners customarily agree to reserve form
objections until the time of trial, and waiver agreements may be allowed under the amended rule.3° ' In the absence of a waiver agreement, if a party disagrees with the form of a question or if he
considers an answer nonresponsive, Rule 204(4) requires him to
state such during the deposition or the objection is waived.3 °2
A minor change made in the language of section 4 is that the deposition officer should record all testimony elicited from the witness
even though it may be the subject of an objection by the opponent.
Thereafter, the propriety of the objection may be ruled on by the
trial judge.3 °3
297. TEX. R. Civ. P. 204(4).

298. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 212 (Vernon 1976).
299. See id.214 (Vernon 1976). See generally Haney Elec. Co. v. Hurst, 624 S.W.2d
602, 606-07 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, writ dism'd) (discussion of admissibility of unre-

sponsive deposition testimony).
300. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 204(4).

301. The rule speaks in mandatory terms; however, the policy underlying discovery by
agreement should allow for non-waiver agreements, pursuant to Rule 11, similar to those

currently utilized by practitioners.
302. See id 204(4).
303. See id Generally, it is improper to direct the witness, either explicitly or implicitly, not to answer a question. See Langston Corp. v. Standard Register Co., 95 F.R.D. 386,
390 (N.D. Ga. 1982). Even if the question inquires into irrelevant matters, the better practice may be to answer the question and to note one's objection. See International Union of
Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 91 F.R.D. 277, 280 (D.D.C.
1981). The one objection that should be made is an objection based on privilege. Cf.4A D.
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SUBMISSION TO WITNESS; CHANGES; SIGNING

Incorporated into new Rule 205 is former Rule 209.304 As
amended, Rule 205 states that the deposition of a party-witness may
be submitted to the party's attorney of record.3 °5 This is analogous
to the former rule's provision permitting the deposition officer to
notify a party's attorney that the deposition was ready for inspection.3" 6 In addition, the first paragraph of Rule 205 makes reference
to the permissibility of a waiver, by the parties and the witness, of
the signature requirement as well as the requirement that the witness examine the deposition after it has been transcribed.30 7 This is
simply putting in writing what was already a common practice.
The final portion of the first paragraph of former Rule 209 has
been deleted from the amended rule. The old rule distinguished between depositions of parties and non-parties. The purpose of this
deletion and the modification to the second paragraph of Rule 205 is
to equate parties and non-parties with regard to the deposition officer's authority to file an unsigned, unexamined deposition. 30 Rule
205 now states that if the witness fails to sign and return the deposition within twenty days of its submission to him, the deposition officer should state the facts underlying the absence of the signature
on the deposition. 3 9 The deposition may then be used at trial as
though it were signed. Reference then is made to amended Rule
207, which governs the use of depositions at trial. 3 10 As in the former rule, the court has discretion to exclude all or part of the unsigned deposition if the reasons given for the failure to sign so
require. 3 " No change was made in the manner of making changes
in a deposition.3 12

EPSTEIN, J. LUCAS & J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE,

30.59 (2d ed. 1983) (claim

of privilege should be raised at taking of deposition).
304. Compare TEX. R. Civ. P. 205 with Tex. R. Civ. P. 209 (Vernon 1976).
305. TEX. R. Civ. P. 205.
306. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 209 (Vernon 1976).
307. See TEX. R. CIv. P. 205.
308. See Reporter's Note to Amended Rule 205.
309. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 205.
310. See id
311. See id.
312. See id (changes in form or substance entered on deposition by officer with witness' statement of reasons for making changes).
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RULE

206:

CERTIFICATION AND FILING BY OFFICER;

EXHIBITS; COPIES; NOTICE OF FILING

Rule 206 contains portions of former Rules 208, 208a, and 210.1'"
The rule previously numbered 206 has been repealed and its substance incorporated into amended Rule 204. Amended Rule 206
now includes all matters relating to the proper handling of a com34
pleted deposition.
Sections 1 through 4 of Rule 206 were patterned after Federal
Rule 30(f). 3' Section 1 clarifies the procedure to be used in certifying and filing depositions. The rule states that it is the duty of the
officer taking the deposition to transcribe and file it. 3 16 The certification is to include the charges incurred in preparing the completed

deposition.317 Once the deposition has been certified, the deposition
officer is to seal it in an envelope stating the title of the action and

the name of the deponent. It is then filed with the court in which the

action is pending. 3 8 The procedure for filing is subject to being altered by court order.31 9
Section 2 contains new materials concerning the treatment of exhibits. Any party may request that exhibits be marked and annexed
to the deposition, and parties maintain the right to inspect and copy
such exhibits.320 If the party supplying the exhibits wishes to retain
them, he may do so in two ways: first, he may provide verified copies to be substituted for the originals; or, second, he may have the
313. Compare id. 206 (certification and filing of deposition; exhibits; copies; notice of
filing) with Tex. R. Civ. P. 208 (Vernon 1976) (depositions certified and returned) and id.
208a (Vernon 1976) (certification of officer's charges for completion of deposition) and id.
210 (Vernon 1976) (opening of depositions on file by clerk for inspection of party).
314. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 206.
315. Compare id. 206(1) (certification and filing of deposition by officer) and id. 206(2)
(exhibits) and id. 206(3) (furnishing copies of deposition to parties or deponent) and id
206(4) (notice of filing) with FED. R. Civ. P. 30(f) (certification and filing by officers; exhibits; copies; notice of filing).
316. TEX. R. Civ. P. 206(1); cf. 4A D. EPSTEIN, J. LUCAS & J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, $ 30.63[3] (2d ed. 1983) (discussion of filing requirement under Federal
Rule 30(f)).
317. TEX. R. Civ. P. 206(1).
318. See id.
319. See id. The federal interpretation of the "unless otherwise ordered by the court"
language in the first portion of the rule is that it was intended to allow the court to permit
parties to retain depositions unless they are to be used in the action. See FED. R. Civ. P.
30(f)(1) advisory committee note to 1980 amendment.
320. TEX. R. Civ. P. 206(2).
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originals marked and offer them for inspection and copying by the
other parties, after which the materials may be used as if annexed to
the deposition.3 2 ' The analogous portion of Federal Rule 30 has
been construed so that "[s]uch copies are a 'substitute' for the originals, which are not to be marked and which can thereafter be used
or even disposed of by the person who produces them. 3 22 If a disagreement arises concerning the disposition of original exhibits, the
court may order that the originals be annexed to and returned with
the deposition pending final disposition of of the case.323
Rule 206(3) states that the deposition officer shall furnish a copy
of the deposition to any party or to the deponent upon payment of
reasonable charges therefor. 324 A problem that has arisen in the
federal courts concerns who is required to make payment for the
original transcription of the deposition. 325 This problem is based
upon the wording of Federal Rule 30(c). 32 6 Professors Wright and
discretion in the trial
Miller have concluded that Rule 30(c) invests 32
7
parties.
all
or
one
on
judge to apportion costs
Prior to the 1984 amendments, Rule 208a directed that "[t]he
clerk of the court where such deposition is filed shall tax as costs the
321. See id.
322. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(f)(1) advisory committee note to 1980 amendment. The same
language in the Federal Rule has been construed thusly: "An amendment of Rule 30(f)(1)
adopted in 1980 clarifies the previously opaque language and makes it explicit that a party
can offer copies of a document to be marked and to serve thereafter as an original for all
purposes." 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2114 (Supp.
1982).
323. See TEX. R. CIv. P. 206(2). Such an order would likely be made pursuant to TEX.
R. Civ. P. 166b(4).
324. See id. 206(3).
325. See Caldwell v. Wheeler, 89 F.R.D. 145, 147-48 (D. Utah 1981); Haymes v. Smith,
73 F.R.D. 572, 574-75 (W.D.N.Y. 1976); see also 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2117 (1970) (recognition of problem in assessing cost of transcription of deposition).
326. See FED. R. CIv. P. 30(c) ("If requested by one of the parties, the testimony shall
be transcribed."). The problem generally arose when the party who initiated the deposition
did not request a transcript but his opponent did. In such situations, the issue was "whether
a reasonable charge for the transcript was the cost of a copy or whether the party who
wished the transcript had to bear the charge for transcribing the deposition." 8 C. WRIGHT
& A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2117 (1970).
327. See 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §.2117
(1970); see also Caldwell v. Wheeler, 89 F.R.D. 145, 148 (D. Utah 1981) (after party who
instigated deposition shows extenuating circumstances to relieve him from paying for transcripts, court has discretion to allocate costs among parties).
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charges for preparing the original copy of the deposition. ' 328 This
portion of the rule, however, is omitted from the amended rules.
Hence, the confusion that exists in the federal courts now may exist
in Texas. Texas courts should take a practical approach in resolving
this matter.
Generally, the party initiating the deposition will wish to have it
transcribed and should bear the cost of transcription.329 If the movant does not want the deposition transcribed and a conflict arises as
to who should bear the cost, the trial court should exercise its discretion in charging the expense to the parties. The court may wish to
consider such factors as the overall conduct of the parties during
discovery, whether taking the deposition appears to have been motivated by a good faith effort to discover relevant information, and
the relative degrees of participation by the parties in the deposition
itself. After considering these factors and others, the court may
charge the cost of the deposition entirely against one party or it may
apportion the cost among the parties. 3 °
As under prior practice, the party filing the deposition is to give
prompt notice of the filing to all other parties. 33 1 The final section of
Rule 206 permits the inspection, by parties or the deponent, of a
filed deposition.332 An amendment to the new rule permits the court
to make an order altering or fixing the right to inspect a filed
deposition.333
XIV. RULE 207: USE OF DEPOSITIONS IN COURT PROCEEDINGS
In keeping with the policy of shortening and clarifying the rules
328. Tex. R. Civ. P. 208a (Vernon 1976).
329. See Caldwell v. Wheeler, 89 F.R.D. 145, 147 (D. Utah 1981); 8 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2117 (1970).
330. See 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2117
(1970); 4A D. EPSTEIN, J. LUCAS & J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 30.59 (2d ed.
1983).
331. Compare TEX. R. Civ. P. 206(4) with Tex. R. Civ. P. 198 (Vernon 1976). Regard-

ing the giving of notice of the filing of a written deposition, Professors Wright and Miller
have concluded: "This requirement is frequently ignored and failure to give the required
notice is waived in the absence of a motion to suppress the deposition." 8 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2119 (1970). A similar result is dictated by
amended TEX. R. Civ. P. 207(3).
332. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 206(5).
333. See id. The old rule's requirement that the clerk indorse on the deposition at
whose request the deposition was inspected has been omitted from Rule 206. See Tex. R.
Civ. P. 210 (Vernon 1976).
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when proper, the supreme court set forth in one rule the guidelines
for the use of depositions in court proceedings.334 Formerly, these
provisions were covered in Rules 211-213. 335 Several aspects of the
former practice were retained,
and additional matters were adopted
336
rules.
federal
the
from
Amended Rule 207 is slightly broader than before as it provides
that a deposition "may be used by any person for any purpose
against any party who was present or represented at the taking of
the deposition or who had reasonable notice thereof. ' 337 Further,
Rule 207 now states that deposition testimony is permitted "insofar
as admissible under the rules of evidence applied as though the witness were then present and testifying ...
338 The newly promulgated Texas Rules of Evidence exclude deposition testimony from
the definition of hearsay; 339 therefore, when such testimony is offered, it will not be subject to a hearsay objection, but all non340
waived objections may be interposed.
The long-standing Texas rule permitting the use of depositions
regardless of the presence or absence of the deponent is retained in
Rule 207. 34 ' The Committee on Administration of Justice recommended that an exception be established that would preclude the
use of depositions if the deponent were present at trial. This exception would have been based upon a finding by the court that the oral
testimony of the witness was necessary in the interest of justice and
a finding that the witness could be brought into trial either of his
334. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 207.

335. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 211-213 (Vernon 1976).
336. Compare TEX. R. Civ. P. 207(l) (use of depositions) with FED. R. Civ. P. 32(a)

(use of depositions).
337. TEX. R. Civ. P. 207(I); see In re of Johns-Manville/Asbestosis Cases, 93 F.R.D.
853, 854-55 (N.D. Il. 1982) (plaintiff allowed to use deposition of deceased physician who

had testified for subsidiary corporation in prior case because of close relationship between
corporations involved). In Safeco Ins. Co. P. Gipson,the court permitted the plaintiff to use a

deposition taken prior to the insurance company being substituted for the insured. See
Safeco Ins. Co. v. Gipson, 619 S.W.2d 275, 278 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1981, writ
dism'd w.o.j.). The court found this to be fair since the insurance company's attorney was
present at the taking of the deposition. See id.at 278.
338. TEX. R. Civ. P. 207(1).
339. TEX. R. EVID. 801(E)(3).
340. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 204(4).
341. See id. 207(); see also Hall v. White, 525 S.W.2d 860, 862 (Tex. 1975); Spring
Branch Bank v. Mengden, 628 S.W.2d 130, 138 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, writ

refd n.r.e.).
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own volition or by subpoena. This proposal was rejected, making it
clear that the Texas Supreme Court wishes to maintain the wellestablished Texas rule allowing the use of depositions in court pro342
ceedings regardless of the presence or absence of the deponent.
Section 2 of Rule 207 is taken verbatim from former Rule
213(2).343 Only one comment need be made regarding substitution
of parties. This provision originally was borrowed from Federal
Rule 32(a)(4) at a time when there apparently existed a requirement
that the prior action be dismissed before the deposition could be
used in a later action. In 1980, however, the federal rule was reworded to omit this putative requirement. The United States
Supreme Court Advisory Committee stated: "The requirement that
a prior action must have been dismissed before depositions taken
for use in it can be used in a subsequent action was doubtless an
oversight, and the courts have ignored it."344 Although the Texas
rule retains this "requirement," Texas courts must decide whether to
allow it to be raised as
an impediment to the use of depositions
3 45
action.
prior
a
taken in
Section 3 of Rule 207 covers motions to suppress. 346 The new rule
is substantially broader than former Rule 212 in that it covers virtually all aspects of the notice, transcription, delivery, and filing of the
deposition.347 Specifically, if the deposition has been on file one day
342. The use of depositions under Federal Rule 32(a)(3) is not as well established as
Texas. See, e.g., Redhead v. United States, 686 F.2d 178, 184 (3d Cir. 1982) (court's allowance of witness' deposition at trial when witness was present in courtroom, harmless error),
cert. denied, - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 1190, - L. Ed. 2d - (1983); In re Transcontinental
Energy Corp., 683 F.2d 326, 330 (9th Cir. 1982) (deposition excluded because party failed to
prove that deponent lived more than 100 miles from place of hearing); In re Checkmate
Stereo & Elecs., Ltd., 21 Bankr. 402, 413 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982) (showing of unavailability
of party deponent not required prior to admission of deposition).
343. Compare TEX. R. Civ. P. 207(2) with Tex. R. Civ. P. 213(2) (Vernon 1976).
344. FED. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(4) advisory committee note to 1980 amendment.
345. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 207(2).
346. See id.207(3).
347. Compareid with Tex. R. Civ. P. 212 (Vernon 1975). Many courts of appeals have
been hesitant to enforce technical signature and filing requirements when to do so would
cause an unfair result. Hence, they have slowly broadened the definition of "manner of
taking" in former Rule 212. See, e.g., Baylor Univ. Medical Center v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
587 S.W.2d 501, 506 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ refd n.r.e.) (signature waived);
Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Henson, 569 S.W.2d 516, 517 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1978, no writ) (nonresponsive answer deals with manner of taking deposition); Victoria
Comfort Air Co. v. Alamo Express, Inc., 529 S.W.2d 250, 252 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1975, no writ) (waiver of improper mailing address of court reporter). The new rule
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before trial and notice thereof was given, a motion to suppress must
be made before trial or all such errors are waived.348 Rule 207(3)
must be read in conjunction with Rule 204(4), which requires that
objections as to the form of questions or the responsiveness of answers be made at the time the deposition is taken or they are
waived.349
XV.

RULE 208:

DEPOSITIONS UPON WRITTEN QUESTIONS

The final discovery rule regards commencing, taking, and filing a
deposition on written questions. Rule 208 greatly simplifies the determination of how to take such a deposition because it places all
relevant guidelines into one rule.350 It incorporates the substance of
numerous prior rules, most notably Rules 189-192, 197, 208, and
210.

35 1

Section 1 of Rule 208 states that a written deposition may be
taken after "commencement" of the action.352 In addition, it permits the use of Rule 201 to compel the attendance of the witness or
the production of "designated items.

' 353

The contents of former

Rule 189 are now in the second and third paragraphs of Rule 208.
Rule 208 maintains the ten-day notice requirement for taking a deposition on written questions, and the contents of the notice are substantially the same as under the former rule. 354 An addition to the
rule is the modification that was added to the proviso regarding production of documents. Rule 208 contains the language consistently
used throughout the new rules, which states that such requests
should be "by individual item or by category

. . .

with reasonable

no longer uses the "manner of taking" language, thus impliedly negating the effects of these
cases. The results, however, reached in 'these cases are now brought about by the specific
language of Rule 207. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 207(3).
348. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 207(3).
349. See id 207(3), 204(4).
350. See id 208.
351. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 189 (Vernon 1976) (notice and service of written questions); id.
190 (Vernon 1976) (notice by publication); id. 191 (Vernon 1976) (service of notice of depositions when citation by publication); id 192 (Vernon 1976) (cross-questions); id. 197
(Vernon 1976) (use of interpreter at deposition); id. 208 (Vernon 1976) (certification and
return of depositions); id 210 (Vernon 1976) (opening of depositions for inspection by parties or deponent).
352. See TEX. R. Ctv. P. 208(1).
353. Id
354. See id.
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particularity. 355 The final paragraph of section 1 is taken verbatim
from old Rule 189.356
Section 2 of Rule 208 incorporates closely the language of former
Rules 190 and 191.3.7 These rules governed notice by publication
and service of citation by publication. No apparent changes were
intended in these provisions. The language in former Rule 189 regarding service upon corporations and joint stock associations has
been deleted.
Cross-questions, redirect and recross questions, and formal objections are now controlled by Rule 208(3).358 The amended rule
maintains the time schedule established under former Rule 192, i.e.,
cross-questions are due within ten days of service of direct questions, redirect questions are due within five days, then recross questions are due within three days. 359 Minor textual changes also were
made. Rule 208(5) requires the delivery of all cross, redirect, and
360
recross questions to the deposition officer.
Two additions were made to section 3 of Rule 208. First, the rule
now provides that "objections to the form of written questions are
waived unless [they are] served in writing upon the party propounding them within the time allowed for serving the succeeding cross or
other questions and within five days after service of the last questions authorized."' 36' This proviso was adopted from the federal
rules362 and is analogous to the waiver provisions established for
363
oral depositions.
A second change in Rule 208(3) is that the court may, for cause,
enlarge or shorten the time allowed for questions.364 The ten, five,
and three day time limits formerly were used in the federal courts,
355. Id
356. Compare id (naming of corporation as witness to be deposed) with Tex. R. Civ. P.
189 (Vernon 1976) (naming of corporation as witness to be deposed).
357. Compare TEX. R. Cv. P. 208(2) (notice by publication and service of notice when
citation by publication) with Tex. R. Civ. P. 190 (Vernon 1976) (notice by publication) and

id.191 (Vernon 1976) (service of notice of depositions when citation by publication).
358. TEX. R. Civ. P. 208(3).
359. Compare id.with Tex. R. Civ. P. 192 (Vernon 1976).

360.
361.
362.
363.
364.

See TEX. R. Civ. P. 208(5).
Id 208(3).
See FED. R. Civ. P. 32(d)(3)(c).
See TEX. R. Civ. P. 204(4).
See id.208(3).
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and Professors Wright and Miller considered them "unrealistic. '365
Subsequently, the federal rule was amended to lengthen the time
limits and to allow the court to enlarge or shorten the time.366 The
Texas rule maintains the stringent time limits, but the trial judge
now is empowered to alter them if necessary, and he should utilize
his discretion to do so in a proper case.367
A possible problem that could arise under amended Rule 208 centers around the rule's time limits. Notice of the taking of a written
deposition may be served "[a]fter the commencement of the action,"
which may be interpreted to mean the filing of the original petition.
Thereafter, cross-questions are due within ten days. It would be
possible for the time limit for cross-questions to lapse before answer
day.36 8 In those instances in which notice of a written deposition is
filed immediately after the action is commenced, the trial judge is
empowered to enlarge the time for cross-questions until ten days
after answer day.369
Section 4 of Rule 208 establishes who is authorized to act as a
deposition officer.37° Professor William Dorsaneo, who served as
the reporter to the Advisory Committee, noted that "[plaragraph 4
makes it clear that a person who is authorized to administer oaths,
such as a notary public, may take a written deposition, even though
he or she is not a certified shorthand reporter."' 37 1 In addition, the
amended rule permits such authorized persons to issue a subpoena
or a subpoena duces tecum pursuant to Articles 2324b and 3746.372
Section 4 incorporates the language of former Rule 197 authorizing
365. See 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2132
(1970).
366. See FED. R. CIv. P. 32.
367. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 208(3).
368. This timing problem did not arise under former practice because the rules generally were interpreted to allow service of notice only after answer day. The new rule is
clearer, but it could give rise to the problem discussed herein. In addition, this problem is
not common in federal courts because of the longer thirty-day time limit established for
serving cross-questions. See FED. R. CIv. P. 31(a).
369. Cf TEX. R. CIv. P. 200 (requires leave of court if party wishes to take oral deposition before answer day of defendant). It may be that the most appropriate way to deal with
this problem is to read into Rule 208 the provision of Rule 200 requiring leave of court if a
party wishes to take a written deposition prior to the appearance day of the defendant.
370. Id. 208(4).
371. Reporter's Note to Amended Rule 208.
372. TEX. R. Civ. P. 208(4); see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 2324b, 3746 (Vernon
Supp. 1982-1983).
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the deposition officer to summon and swear an interpreter to facilitate the taking of the deposition.373
Rule 208(5) controls the taking and the return of a written deposition.374 Section 5 replaces former Rule 196 and incorporates by reference Rules 204-206, which previously have been discussed.375 The
requirement of notice of the filing of a written deposition, formerly
contained in Rule 198, is now in section 5 also.376 Rule 208 coninspection of filed depositions unless the
cludes by permitting the
377
court orders otherwise.

XVI.

CONCLUSION

Although the amendment process is a continuing one, the April 1,
1984 promulgations rectify many troublesome procedural problems
and greatly simplify the format of the rules. Practitioners must familiarize themselves with the 1984 rules and must work within the
framework established by the rules. Trial and appellate judges must
stand ready to enforce the rules and control the conduct of litigants.
Litigants and attorneys should recognize the potential long-term
effects of abusive discovery practices. A practice that appears strategically or tactically sound may develop into an unacceptable blemish upon the complexion of our system of civil procedure. Zealous
advocacy cannot be used to camouflage improper discovery practices. Attorneys must assume the responsibility for discontinuing
unnecessary and costly pretrial practices and for streamlining litigation procedures. The alternative to professional self-control is mandated regulation by the persons who ultimately must assume the
burden for and cost of prolonged litigation.
The trial judges must require compliance with the rules, discourage needless and costly court appearances, and strive to dispose of
court business in a fair but efficient manner. Indeed, the trial courts
lie on the cutting edge of systematic reform. They must exert their
full efforts in this quest. The 1984 rules provide a framework for
change. But, as with any framework, it is the implementation that
ultimately will determine the success of the new rules.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.

Compare TEX. R. Civ. P. 208(4) with Tex. R. Civ. P. 197 (Vernon 1976).
See TEX. R. Civ. P. 208(5).
See supra text accompanying notes 289-333.
Compare TEX. R. Civ. P. 208(5) with Tex. R. Civ. P. 198 (Vernon 1976).
See TEX. R. Civ. P. 208(5). This provision is also found in TEX. R. Civ. P. 206(5).
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Discovery problems sought to be remedied by the 1984 amendments are neither new nor unique to Texas. 378 All members of the
Texas legal community, both the bench and the bar, must conscientiously strive to work within the spirit, if not the letter, of these rules.
Nothing more is required. Anything less will thwart the design and
mission of the amendment process.

378. See generally Annual Message on the Administration of Justice from Chief Justice
Warren E. Burger (Midyear Meeting of the American Bar Association, February 12, 1984)
(available from United States Supreme Court Public Information Office).
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